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FOREWORD
Inadequately-managed ammunition poses serious security and humanitarian risks. 
Potential for unintended explosion and diversion to the illicit market exponentially 
increases when the security of stockpile diminishes. As a corollary, effective 
physical security and stockpile management prevents unwanted diversion to 
illicit markets, including to non-State armed groups, terrorists and transnational 
criminal organizations. For these groups, ammunition with a high explosive quality is 
particularly attractive for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. In addition 
to mitigating security breaches, the safe and secure management of ammunition 
also prevents humanitarian disasters, including death, injury and displacement that 
result from explosions at munitions sites.
Against this backdrop, and to support States as well as relevant implementing 
partners on the ground, the United Nations developed the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines (IATG) in 2008. We did this at the request of the General Assembly. 
The IATG contain practical, modular guidance to support States in safely and securely 
managing conventional ammunition stockpiles.
Under the umbrella of UN SaferGuard, our knowledge-management programme 
on ammunition management, the United Nations system continues to promote 
the IATG, supporting States and regional organizations in further mitigating the 
brazen risks of unwanted blasts and frequent diversion of ammunition stockpiles.
These efforts are pursued in the broader context of the Sustainable Development 
Goals, in particular Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions and its target 
related to a significant reduction in illicit arms flows and Goal 11 on safe cities. States 
have critically recognized that there can be no development without security and safety.
Moreover, addressing poorly-managed ammunition stockpiles constitutes a key 
component of the Secretary-General’s agenda for disarmament, Security Our 
Common Future. The Secretary-General has prioritized “disarmament that saves 
lives” and views attention to ammunition management as a concrete activity in 
realizing this pillar of his agenda.
This guide – an excellent example of synergetic cooperation between GICHD and 
the United Nations – is published in support of IATG users. It clarifies how the 
measures within the IATG are to be interpreted and applied in practice. It explains 
technical concepts and processes in a simple, clear, and concise manner.
The hope is that this guide will support the broadest selection of users in navigating 
the principles, methodology and technical content of the IATG with the ultimate 
goal of “saving lives”.
Izumi Nakamitsu 
Under-Secretary-General and 
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
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IDDRS Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards 
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IMAS International Mine Action Standards 
IMD Inter-Magazine Distance
IQD Inside Quantity Distances
ITI  International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and 
Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (International Tracing 
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MOD  Ministry of Defence (UK)
MOSAIC Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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OEWG Open-ended working group (established by the UNGA)
OQD Outside Quantity Distances
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBD Process Building Distance
PES Potential Exposion Site
PIDS Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems
PRC People’s Republic of China
PTRD Public Traffic Route Distance
RRPL Risk Reduction Process Level 
SAF Singapore Armed Forces
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SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCG Strategic Coordination Group 
SOPs Standing Operating Procedures 
STM Safe to move
TCN Troop Contributing Nation
TLM Through Life Management
TRB Technical Review Board
UEMS Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UOS Unit Of Space
01
INTRODUCTION 
01
 —
 I
nt
ro
du
ct
io
n
11 |
1.1  OVERVIEW
The International Technical Ammunition Guidelines (IATG) are an internationally-accepted 
global frame of reference for the development of national standards and Standing 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) on ammunition stockpile management. In 2011, the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) welcomed the completion of the IATG 
and encouraged their use by States on a voluntary basis. 1) A growing number of 
States and implementing partners are using the IATG to enhance the safety and 
security of ammunition stockpiles.
The IATG are regularly reviewed to reflect developments in the field. They are currently 
in their second edition (2015) and consist of 12 thematic volumes, subdivided into 
45 individual modules. The 12 IATG volumes guide users in performing ammunition 
stockpile management at three progressive risk reduction process levels (RRPL) : 
1 (basic), 2 (intermediate), and 3 (advanced). The IATG are supported by the IATG 
implementation support toolkit, 2) which provides software applications and online 
tools to aid in the development and implementation of national standards and SOPs.
The UN SaferGuard Programme – supported by a Technical Review Board (TRB) and 
a Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) of implementing partners – is the caretaker 
of the IATG. It allows for holistic oversight and dissemination of the IATG and its 
supporting toolkit. 3)
1.2  WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDE ?
The IATG are technical guidelines meant to guide national authorities, on a voluntary 
basis, to improve stockpile management policies and practices in order to minimize 
the risk of Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS) and diversion. Whereas 
some States have comprehensive ammunition management systems where 
planning, procurement, stockpile management and disposal is considered, this 
is not yet the case in many others. There can be a lack of political will, financial 
resources, normative and organizational frameworks, infrastructure and equipment, 
as well as human resources, necessary to develop holistic ammunition management 
regimes and systems.
 What is ammunition ?  
The IATG define ammunition as a complete device, (e.g. missile, shell, mine, 
demolition store etc.) charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, 
initiating composition or nuclear, biological or chemical material for use in 
connection with offence, or defence, or training, or non-operational 
purposes, including those parts of weapons systems containing explosives. 4)
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The IATG assist States in being aware of and understanding what comprehensive am-
munition management entails, including the principles of ammunition management ; 
risk management ; ammunition accounting, storage, processing, transportation, 
and security ; ammunition demilitarization and destruction ; ammunition accidents, 
reporting and investigation, as well as ammunition operational support.
This guide illustrates how the IATG can be accessed and applied, towards safe 
and secure management of ammunition. Accordingly, the aims of the Critical Path 
Guide to the IATG are twofold :
1. To bring awareness and help States and other users understand how the measures 
within the IATG are to be interpreted and applied in practice. It explains technical 
concepts and processes in a simple, clear and concise manner. Examples and 
illustrations are plentiful, as are pointers to further resources listed at the end ;
2. To inform individuals who are new to the issue of ammunition management. While 
it is not meant to serve as a policy tool, it includes definitions and terminology ; 
summaries of key issues, instruments and measures ; and provides an overview 
of the role of various institutions involved in providing international assistance 
for ammunition management.
1.3  WHO CAN BENEFIT FROM THIS GUIDE ?
The main intended users of this guide are States. It is designed as a resource for na-
tional authorities and has applicability for the following groups of national stakeholders :
• Representatives involved in negotiating, developing and implementing international 
ammunition management policy and programmes ;
• Regulators involved in the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
of national legislation, policy and regulations ;
• Those involved in the supervision and management of an ammunition stockpile ; and
• Those involved in the day-to-day operation of ammunition storage and processing 
facilities.
This guide can also be helpful for any organization (private or public) involved in 
the development of ammunition management capabilities at the national level.
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1.4  HOW CAN THIS GUIDE BE USED ?
To gain a comprehensive understanding of the IATG, users are encouraged to read 
the entire guide. Individuals who wish to focus on a particular aspect, volume, or 
module of the IATG will find it useful to consult relevant sections. Therefore, each 
section of the guide is self-contained.
The guide includes icons in the left margin, to alert the reader to special information 
in the text. The icons have the following meanings :
 
Points out technical terms or issues.  
Highlights approaches or measures to improve ammunition management 
policies and practices. 
Indicates important information to bear in mind when specific ammunition 
management techniques or measures are applied at the national level. 
Draws the reader’s attention to potential challenges or pitfalls, and 
examples of unplanned explosions in munitions sites or diversion. 
Signals examples of good practice relating to implementation of  
the IATG in practice.
Since the guide is based on the IATG, the tools, techniques and suggestions 
this guide offers are in accordance with the guidelines. The guide should 
therefore be used as a companion to the IATG, not as a substitute for it.
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This section contextualizes the IATG by providing an overview of the history and 
background leading up to their development ; the role of the UN SaferGuard Programme 
and the aim, scope, and structure of the IATG, as well as their application. Section 
3 provides additional detail on their scope, and highlights the relation between the 
IATG and other international arms regulation processes and instruments. Section 4, 
introduces practical and technical measures for ensuring safe and secure ammunition 
management. 
2.1 BACKGROUND TO THE IATG
Many countries have suffered explosions within their own managed ammunition 
stockpiles. Thousands of people have died or been injured, and the livelihoods of 
entire communities have been disrupted. Unsecured or poorly managed national 
ammunition stockpiles also lead to massive diversion into illicit markets. Diverted 
conventional ammunition can also be used to make improvised explosive devices.
 What constitutes a national stockpile ?  
The term “national stockpile” refers to the full range of ammunition 
stockpiles in a country under the control of separate organizations, such as 
the police, military forces (both active and reserve), border guards and 
ammunition-producing companies. The term is applied to all ammunition 
types, irrespective of classification (e.g. operational, training, or awaiting 
disposal). 5)
The safety and security risks posed by conventional ammunition were, in the past, 
largely seen as the result of an accumulation of surplus ammunition, including 
developing States and those recovering from conflict.
 What is surplus ?  
Although there is no agreed-upon international definition of surplus, the 
term is usually used to refer to the quantity of arms and ammunition that 
exceeds the requirements of State defence and security forces. It is up to 
national governments to determine how to identify or calculate surplus 
stockpiles. IATG 1.30, section 11, outlines indicators and procedures for 
identifying surplus.
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Many States suffer from inadequate stockpile management policies and practices, 
lacking one or more of the basic components of an effective stockpile management 
system. 6) Ineffective policies and practices in just one area – whether planning, 
accounting, surveillance, security, storage or destruction – can threaten the integrity 
of the entire ammunition management process, increasing the possibility of surplus 
accumulation and risk of unplanned explosions and diversion.
 What is diversion ? 
Diversion is defined as the shifting of weapons, ammunition or explosives 
from the legal market or owner to an illegal market or owner as a result of 
losses, theft, leakage or proliferation from a stockpile or other source. 7) 
Ammunition is classed as dangerous goods. The risks posed by 
conventional ammunition are twofold :
•  The chemical qualities of ammunition increase the risk of explosion when 
improperly managed ; and
•  Ammunition can also fall prey to diversion, ultimately falling into the 
hands of non-State armed groups or criminals, or States who are not the 
intended end user.
2.2 WHAT ARE THE IATG ?
The IATG provide detailed guidance for voluntary use by States that wish to improve 
the safety and security of their ammunition storage sites.
The UN SaferGuard Programme
Under the auspices of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), 
the UN SaferGuard Programme was established as a knowledge resource man-
agement platform for conventional ammunition management issues in the United 
Nations. Its overall goal is to oversee the dissemination of the IATG and serves as 
their custodian, thus ensuring their technical quality and broadest promotion to 
interested stakeholders.
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Figure 1 – UN SaferGuard website
Welcome to the United Nations. It's your world.
In its Agenda for Disarmament, the Secretary
General calls for the promotion of more effective
State and regional action on excessive and
poorly maintained stockpiles. The
implementation plan for Action 22: Secure
excessive and poorly maintained stockpiles
is now available.
Fact Sheet  on Safe and Secure Ammunition
Management Through the UN SaferGuard
Programme
Video message of HR Nakamitsu to the UN
SaferGuard Technical Review Board and
Strategic Coordination Group
What's new?
Risk reduction checklist Quantity-Distance Map Vertical danger area
Click here for more tools....
IATG implementation support toolkit
In more than 100 countries over the past five decades, poorly-stored ammunition stockpiles have led to grave incidents resulting in accidental explosions and
humanitarian disaster. Thousands of people have been killed, injured and displaced, and the livelihoods of entire communities have been disrupted. In addition to the
humanitarian and socio-economic consequences, unsecured or poorly managed national ammunition stockpiles fuel insecurity. Massive diversion of ammunition to illicit
markets has been a catalyst for armed conflicts and crime in various regions. Diverted ammunition is also increasingly used to assemble improvised explosive devices
(IEDs).
The General Assembly requested the United Nations to develop guidelines for adequate ammunition management. In response, the International Ammunition Technical
Guidelines (IATG) were developed in 2011 and the UN SaferGuard Programme was established as the corresponding knowledge management platform.
IATG version 2  has been launched in 2015.
“Beyond the need for
greater efforts to reduce the
excessive accumulation of
arms, it remains essential
that States ensure effective
physical security and
management of their
stockpiles.
Inadequately maintained
stockpiles constitute serious
humanitarian hazards and
negatively impact peace
and security, and can
thereby jeopardize the
implementation of the
Sustainable Development
Goals. ”
– Antonio Guterres, United
Nations Secretary-
General,Securing Our
Common Future – An
Agenda for Disarmament
 Search UNODA  Search All UN
Copyright Terms of Use Privacy Notice Fraud Alert Contact Us
DISCLAIMER: Some resources listed and/or hyperlinked on this page may be from individuals, organisations and entities other than the United Nations and are provided for information purposes only.
The hyperlinking of outside resources is not an endorsement by the United Nations of the views expressed therein nor does the United Nations have control over the content or accuracy of information
provided. No editorial comment is implied by the omission of a resource or website.
 
 Home Access the IATG IATG Implementation Support Toolkit Information Subscribe to the UN SaferGuard mailing list  Subscribe
 
The aim of the IATG
The objective of conventional ammunition stockpile management is to reduce the 
hazard caused to local communities from unplanned explosion events and to mitigate 
the risks posed by the diversion of ammunition. 8) Providing means to achieve this 
objective, the primary aim of the IATG is to assist States in improving their national 
stockpile management capacity, preventing the accumulation of ammunition in 
surplus and mitigating the safety and security risks posed by ammunition stockpiles. 9)
The main users of the IATG are States aiming to improve the management of national 
ammunition stockpiles. The IATG are also used by other stakeholders who assist 
States in improving their stockpile management policies and practices, including :  10)
• Various United Nations entities ;
• International and regional organizations and other groups of States ;
• Non-governmental organizations and research institutes ;
• Security Council Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts ;
• Peacekeeping training organizations and institutes ; and
• Private sector companies.
The scope of the IATG
The IATG are not legally binding nor do they represent a blueprint that States can 
simply adopt. The IATG are meant to assist authorities in establishing their own 
national policies, standards, and safety and security programmes.
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Although the IATG are primarily focused on stockpile management, they adopt a 
“whole-life management approach” and thus include guidance that spans and is 
relevant to the establishment of a Through Life Management (TLM) system (see 
section 3.1). Ammunition risk management is integral to the application of the IATG. 
The IATG identify three Risk Reduction Process Levels (RRPL), which stakeholders 
can use to assess their risk management situation – taking into account available 
material, financial, and technical resources – and to reduce their level of ammunition- 
related risk (see section 3.1).
 What is Through Life Management (TLM) ?  
TLM is defined in the IATG as an integrated approach to the process, 
planning and costing activities across the whole service life of a specific 
ammunition type. 11)  TLM is a term developed by the United Kingdom’s 
Ministry of Defence as an approach to the acquisition and in-service 
management of military capability in which every aspect of new and 
existing military capability is planned and managed coherently across all 
Defence Lines of Development, from cradle to grave. 12) 
The structure of the IATG
The IATG are divided into 12 volumes and 45 modules. The 12 thematic volumes are :
1. Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management
2. Risk Management
3. Ammunition Accounting
4. Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Field and Temporary Conditions)
5. Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)
6. Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Operations)
7. Ammunition Processing
8. Transport of Ammunition
9. Security of Ammunition
10. Ammunition Demilitarization and Destruction
11. Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation
12. Ammunition Operational Support
Reflecting the Risk Reduction Process Level risk management approach, each 
module is divided into levels of ascending comprehensiveness :
• Level 1 offers the most expedient ways to apply the basic principles of safe and 
secure ammunition management in a particular thematic area. This will reduce 
risk significantly ; 
• Levels 2 and 3 detail progressive measures that can be taken to improve man-
agement of the stockpile in a particular thematic area once additional resources 
can be identified. This will reduce risk further.
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This offers an incremental approach for understanding and applying the IATG with 
the aim of progressively reducing risk. Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the structure 
of module 03.10, which focuses on inventory management. Section 3.1 provides 
more information on the modular and RRPL approach of the IATG.
Figure 2 – Ascending level of comprehensiveness of the IATG
7  Types of ammunition stockpiles (LEVEL 1) .................................................................................. 6 
8  Ammunition stockpile management system requirements (LEVEL 2) ......................................... 7 
9  Stockpile management organisation responsibilities (LEVEL 2) .................................................. 7 
10  Ammunition storage unit responsibilities (LEVEL 1) .................................................................... 8 
11  Ammunition technical inspection unit responsibilities (LEVEL 2) ................................................. 9 
12  Ammunition training unit responsibilities (LEVEL 2) ..................................................................... 9 
13  Ammunition inspectorate responsibilities (LEVEL 3) .................................................................. 10 
14  Ammunition accounting .............................................................................................................. 10 
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2.3 APPLICATION OF THE IATG IN CONTEXT
While the IATG provide technical guidance for improving the safety, security and 
efficiency of ammunition stockpile management, they have to be contextualized 
to reflect the needs and realities on the ground.
To facilitate global dissemination of the IATG, the modules have also been translated 
into multiple languages. Additional translations are currently being sought.
 Are the IATG available in multiple languages ?  
The IATG are currently available in Arabic, English, Portuguese, and 
Russian. Some modules are also available in French and German.  
The latest version of each module can be found at :  
www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/guide-lines/
What additional guidance exists ? 
To further support IATG users and enhance their knowledge, the UN SaferGuard 
website also features a documents repository.
 The documents repository. Relevant international and regional standards, 
guidelines and documents can be found at :  
www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/references/ 
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What is the IATG implementation support toolkit ? 
The IATG implementation support toolkit provides software applications to support 
the implementation of safe, secure and effective ammunition stockpile management. 
The web-based tools are designed for use by ammunition experts who have the 
appropriate technical knowledge and competence. These tools may also be used 
to communicate safety and security requirements to policymakers and other 
stakeholders. 
 
The IATG implementation support toolkit is available at : 
www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/toolkit/ 
The main components of the toolkit include the following :
• Risk Reduction Checklist : designed to assess an ammunition stockpile’s risk 
level. The goal of a conventional ammunition stockpile management organization 
should be to make sure that stockpile management processes are maintained 
at Risk Reduction Process Level 1 as a minimum (see section 3.1). The checklist 
provides the means for experts to do a quick assessment with a view to answer 
the following questions :
• How safe is a specific Explosives Storehouse ?
• Which IATG module activities are the most urgent ?
• For the stockpile concerned, what is the Risk Reduction Process Level ?
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• Quantity-Distance (QD) Map : allows users to generate an illustrative map 
displaying the minimum permissible distance between a site where ammunition 
is stored (Potential Exposion Site) and locations that may be adversely affected 
by a potential explosion at an ammunition storage site (Exposed Site). The 
Quantity-Distance Map tool is limited to ammunition that has a mass explosion 
hazard (i.e. Hazard Division (HD) 1.1). More concretely, the tool provides a means 
for answering the following question :
• What should be the minimum perimeter around an Explosive Storehouse in 
order for an unwanted explosion to only have limited effects ?
 What is an Exposed Site ?  
The IATG define Exposed Sites (ES) as a magazine, cell, stack, truck or trailer 
loaded with ammunition, explosives workshop, inhabited building, 
assembly place or public traffic route which is exposed to the effects of an 
explosion (or fire) at the Potential Exposion Site under consideration. 13)
What is a Potential Explosion Site ?  
The IATG define a Potential Explosion Site (PES) as the location of a quantity 
of explosives that will create a blast, fragment, thermal, or debris hazard in 
the event of an explosion of its content. 14)
• Explosion Consequence Analysis (ECA) : allows users to determine the potential 
hazard or risk to individuals and property from blast effects in the event of an 
undesirable explosion. The ECA tool does not take into account the effects from 
fragmentation. The ECA tool can provide insights into the following questions :
• In the event of an explosion, what is the potential extent of infrastructure 
damage and casualties from blast in the region surrounding the ammunition 
storage site or facility ?
 One of the most efficient means of reducing the consequences of 
unplanned explosions is by the use of effective separation distances. This 
ensures that people and facilities are always at a tolerably safe distance 
from explosives during storage and handling. Such distances should be 
appropriate, recorded and propagated in the form of an Explosives Limit 
Licence (ELL), for each individual explosive storehouse or facility. Section 
4.4 of this guide provides an overview of quantity and separation distances. 
IATG module 2.20 provides detailed guidance on this issue.
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The IATG are designed to assist States and other users to improve safety, security 
and efficiency in conventional ammunition stockpile management by providing 
guidance, by establishing principles and, in some cases, by referring to other related 
international requirements and specifications. Since their inception in 2011, the IATG 
have enjoyed overwhelming international support (see section 2.2). This section 
provides a more in-depth look at the main concepts and theoretical underpinnings 
of the IATG. Section 4 provides an overview of the IATG practical and technical 
guidance for improving the safety and security of ammunition stockpiles.
3.1   WHAT ARE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND INHERENT  
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE IATG ?
It is the prerogative of each State to determine the system of stockpile management 
that is most suited for its national defence and security purposes. While there are 
a range of options and procedures available to ensure effective stockpile manage-
ment, the IATG draw upon established explosives science to provide a common 
understanding of conventional ammunition management. The guidelines provide 
a global frame of reference for a gradual improvement in safety and security of 
ammunition stockpiles, within an integrated risk management process and in line 
with local needs and available financial, technical and human resources. 15)
 National governments hold the primary responsibility to ensure the safety 
and security of their ammunition stockpiles. This should normally be vested 
in an authority, which is responsible for the development and enforcement 
of national legislation and regulations, and which oversees the coordination 
and management of the State’s ammunition stockpile throughout its life 
cycle. Some States may have limited financial and technical resources and 
may not be able to achieve a minimum standard of safe, efficient and 
effective ammunition stockpile management. In conflict-affected settings, 
where there is an absence of full State control and authority, it may be 
necessary for international organizations, such as the United Nations, to 
support ammunition management, in accordance with the principles 
enshrined in the IATG.
The IATG are shaped by the following four guiding principles : 16)
• The right of national governments to apply national standards to their national 
ammunition stockpile ;
• The need to protect those most at risk from undesirable explosive events, (e.g. 
local civilian communities and explosives workers) ;
• The requirement to build national capacity to develop, maintain and apply appropriate 
standards for stockpile management ; and
• The need to maintain consistency and compliance with other international norms, 
conventions and agreements.
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Developing national standards and policies for ammunition management 
In the absence of national legislation, regulations, and standards on ammunition 
management, a State will not be able to achieve long-term improvements in stockpile 
management. The development of appropriate standards and policies is a national 
responsibility and is based on national needs and priorities. These can vary widely 
between States.
For States without developed standards and policies, the IATG offer guidance. 
However, the IATG do not in themselves provide a definitive set of references which 
can be simply duplicated to form a national set of regulations, rather they provide 
the underpinning principles and guidance on which national policy, regulations and 
technical operating procedures may be based.
 The IATG are technical guidelines, and do not provide a template for the 
development of a holistic normative framework for ammunition 
management. Nevertheless, such guidance can be found in the guide to 
Developing National Standards in Accordance with IATG.
Whole-life management approach
The IATG adopt a whole-life management approach to ammunition management. At 
the centre of this approach is risk management, with a particular focus on improving 
stockpile management practices as a means of reducing the probability of unplanned 
explosions at munitions sites and diversion. Specifically, the IATG address the following 
challenges by providing guidance on :
• Categorization and accounting systems, which increase a State’s ability to 
assess the quality and quantity of its stockpile, distinguish between surplus stocks 
and ammunition necessary for operational purposes, and identify loss or theft from 
the ammunition stockpile ;
• Appropriate storage and transportation systems (including relevant infrastructure 
and vehicles), which protect ammunition from external, environmental influences 
and events as well as unauthorized access to facilities ; 
• Surveillance and technical inspection of ammunition, to assess the stability 
and reliability of ammunition, to prevent accumulation of ageing, unstable and 
unsafe ammunition and to diminish the chances of unsafe use, handling, storage, 
and disposal of stocks ; and
• Proper physical security – ranging from effective depot and perimeter security, 
to lock and key systems – which mitigate theft and sabotage.
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A comprehensive approach to ammunition management requires adopting a holistic 
approach to risk management. To reduce the risk of unplanned explosions of ammu-
nition sites and diversion, both the technical and political aspects of ammunition 
management need to be addressed.
 An example of such a comprehensive approach is the concept of Life-Cycle 
Management of Ammunition (LCMA). The LCMA model is based on the 
IATG and stresses the importance of the technical and political aspects :
•  Technical—the functional elements necessary for the management of 
ammunition throughout its life cycle i.e. from planning to procurement, 
through stockpile management, and disposal.
•  Political—the role of national ownership, the structural element necessary 
for effectiveness of the overall system.
For further information about the LCMA model, see Small Arms Survey’s A 
Practical guide to Life-cycle Management of Ammunition. 
Modular and RRPL approach
In order to facilitate the reduction of ammunition-related risks, the IATG use the 
concept of Risk Reduction Process Levels (RRPL) to categorize the various tasks 
and activities associated with ammunition stockpile management. As mentioned in 
section 2.2, the RRPL are defined at three levels (basic, intermediate and advanced), 
based on the complexity of a particular activity or task and the resources required 
to implement them. IATG 01.20 provides a more detailed overview of the RRPL 
system, an index of the different RRPL activities and where additional guidance 
on specific measures is located within the different IATG modules.
 The IATG stress that States should aim to make sure that stockpile 
management processes are maintained at Risk Reduction Process Level 
(RRPL) 1 as a minimum, which will reduce the risk of unplanned explosions 
of ammunition sites and diversion significantly. Ongoing and gradual 
improvements should then be made to the stockpile management 
infrastructure and processes as staff development improves and further 
resources become available. 
Risk cannot be completely eliminated and all 3 RRPL levels carry an element 
of risk acceptance.
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• Level 1.  Represents the most basic compliance with the IATG and suggests that 
the simplest safety and security precautions have been implemented 
in order to prevent an accidental explosion and diversion. A minimal 
investment of resources has taken place in organizational development, 
operating procedures and storage infrastructure.
• Level 2.  Represents an intermediate level of compliance with the IATG, reducing 
the risk of accidental explosion and diversion even further. A medium level 
investment of resources has taken place in organizational development, 
staff technical training, storage and processing infrastructure.
• Level 3.  Represents advanced compliance with the IATG and indicates that a safe, 
secure and effective ammunition stockpile management system has 
been implemented in accordance with best international practice. RRPL 3 
requires the greatest investment. The result is a significant reduction 
in the risk of unplanned explosions of ammunition sites and diversion.
 The design and implementation of an ammunition management system 
should be based on a thorough analysis of the circumstances in which 
ammunition is being stored. For example, in hot climates, where the 
degradation of energetic materials takes place at faster rates, it will be 
necessary to implement robust procedures for the disposal of propellants, 
which have passed their shelf-life expiry date, or implement measures for 
the stability testing of propellants. 
Building national capacity for ammunition personnel
An inherent assumption within the IATG is that they will be used by suitably qualified 
and competent ammunition personnel. Yet, in many States such personnel are 
lacking and there is very little international guidance explaining what competencies 
are required for the various roles within an ammunition management system.
 What is competency ?  
According to the IATG, competence refers to the ability of an individual to 
do the job properly and the term competency refers to the related 
knowledge, skills, abilities, attributes and behavioural traits of an individual. 17)
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A fundamental element of any safe system of work is that activities are conducted 
by appropriately trained and competent personnel. In developing their own national 
ammunition management competences, IATG 01.90 suggests that States develop 
capacity in the following functional areas, as described in Table 1.
Table 1 – Functional categories of qualified ammunition personnel  18)
Category Description of role 
Ammunition operator Assists in the handling and movement of ammunition and 
explosive substances and articles during issue, receipt, storage 
and distribution. 
Ammunition processor Inspects, maintains and repairs ammunition or other explosive 
substances and articles.
Ammunition accountant Accurately accounts for ammunition and explosive substances 
and articles. 
Ammunition supervisor Supervises the issue, receipt, storage, distribution,  
maintenance and disposal of ammunition and explosive 
substances and articles. 
Ammunition manager Manages the storage, issue, receipt, distribution, maintenance 
and stockpile management of ammunition and explosive 
substances and articles. 
Ammunition inspector Develops, implements and audits the policy and technical 
instructions for all aspects of the stockpile management of 
ammunition and explosive substances and articles. 
Ammunition regulator Develops national policy and technical instructions for all 
aspects of the stockpile management of ammunition and 
explosive substances and articles.
 It is recommended that States take an incremental approach to developing 
individual competences and that the focus should be on the ammunition 
operator, supervisor and accountant roles. As personnel become more 
adept, the focus should shift to developing the higher-level competences 
associated with ammunition and explosives management, inspection, 
surveillance and national regulation. 
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3.2  AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT WITHIN AND  
BEYOND THE NATIONAL STOCKPILE
The IATG are primarily designed to provide to States and other users, guidance for 
the safe and secure management of national ammunition stockpiles – i.e. the full 
range of ammunition stocks under the control of separate organizations such as 
the police, armed forces, border guards, and ammunition-producing companies. 
States may also provide ammunition for multi-national operations. The IATG provide 
guidance for ammunition management in such contexts.
Ammunition management by police forces
The IATG define “small unit” ammunition stockpiles as those referring to “any 
organization, at the tactical level, where individuals are involved in the storage, 
handling and use of ammunition and explosives but are not directly managed by 
ammunition qualified personnel” 19). Examples include ammunition stocks stored 
at police stations, isolated small military units, and border guard posts.
 What is an Explosives Storage Area (ESA) ?  
The IATG define an Explosives Storage Area as an area used for the storage 
of explosives and within which authorized ammunition or missile 
preparation, inspection and rectification operations may also be  
carried out. 20)
While the types and quantities of ammunition at such locations might not be as 
complex and large as those stored at central Explosives Storage Areas (ESA) or 
facilities, they can still pose safety and security risks to local populations and the 
State. This is especially true when ammunition and explosives are recovered by 
police, or other security agencies, and not handled or stored appropriately (see 
Boxes 1 and 2).
Box 1 – Improperly stored recovered explosives in Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, China
On 22 June 2005, an explosion occurred in a chemical plant in Taiyuan. The incident 
was caused by confiscated explosives that had been stored at the facility by the local 
police. At the time of writing, the exact cause of the explosion and the reasons for why 
they were stored at the chemical plant remain unknown. However, reports suggest that 
it resulted in considerable damage to the infrastructure of the chemical plant and the 
surrounding buildings – windows were shattered within a 1.5 km radius of the location. 
About 336 individuals were injured as a result of the blast, including 80 pupils of a 
nearby primary school.
Source : Small Arms Survey (2018).
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IATG 12.20 provides guidance for small unit ammunition management. Themes 
covered by the guidance include : small unit storage requirements, magazine 
infrastructure, ammunition inspections and measures to take when encountering 
recovered or confiscated ammunition and explosives, including how to dispose 
of them. Specifically, the module is designed to be used as a checklist and a basic 
reference guide ; it points users to the more comprehensive clauses within the 
IATG that should be applied to small unit ammunition stores, in order to ensure 
that the storage complies with at least RRPL 1.
Ammunition management on multi-national operations
Besides national security forces and ammunition-producing companies, ammunition 
may also be held by multi-national forces engaged in peace operations, including :  21)
• Those mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC) ;
• Those undertaken by regional organizations (e.g. African Union) ; and/or
• Those undertaken by coalitions of States
The various multi-national operations primarily take place in conflict-affected settings. 
To successfully carry out their mandate under these conditions – such as protection 
of civilians – those engaged must ensure operational readiness, a key component of 
which is maintaining the safety and security of their ammunition stockpiles. Improper 
stockpile management during a peace operation can endanger both uniformed and 
civilian persons (see Boxes 2 and 3).
Box 2 – Mortar accident in Mali : the consequences of improper ammunition management
On 6 July 2016, a 60 mm mortar bomb exploded in the barrel during a live firing exercise 
conducted outside the Dutch UN Mission camp near Kidal, north-eastern Mali. Two 
Dutch soldiers lost their lives and another was seriously wounded. An investigation 
by the Dutch Safety Board concluded that military personnel had been working with 
ammunition that suffered from weak technical design elements and which had not 
been properly tested for quality or safety. The closure plate on the mortar fuze that 
exploded was defective and failed to prevent an explosion while in safe mode. The 
reliability of the ammunition had been further impaired as a result of storage and usage 
in unfavourable conditions : the materiel had been exposed to both high temperatures 
and moisture. As a result, the sensitivity of the explosive components in the fuze had 
increased, which, when combined with the shock from the launch of the mortar bomb, 
led to the explosion.
Sources : Dutch Safety Board (2017) ; 
Reuters (2017) ; Carapic et al (2018), p. 34.
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Ammunition for multi-national operations might not necessarily be directly managed 
by ammunition experts or qualified personnel. Guidance for managing, securing, storing 
and transporting weapons, ammunition and other contingent-owned equipment 
(COE) and as well as recovered weapons, are laid out in numerous mission-specific 
and UN-level documents.
IATG 12.10 – pertaining to ammunition for multi-national operations – complements 
existing UN and mission-specific guidance documents by providing a reference 
guide for Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) during handling, storage and transport 
of ammunition. The principles and procedures for safe and secure ammunition 
management are the same whether the ammunition is managed by national security 
forces and stored in an Explosives Storage Area or whether they are managed by 
multi-national forces and held in temporary or field storage locations. While the range 
of procedures during deployed operations will be substantially less than at the base 
or logistics level, IATG 12.10 explains relevant measures to be implemented, by 
TCNs, to ensure that ammunition stockpile management during peace operations 
complies to a minimum of RRPL 1.  22)
 The IATG recommend that  TCNs develop Standing Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) alongside their national stockpile management SOPs, for the sound 
management of the ammunition stockpile available within their national 
contingents deployed to peace operations. These SOPs need to be 
harnessed within the national SOPs, UN safety requirements and local 
conditions of the host countries  23) (see section 3.1).
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Box 3 – Ammunition management and arms embargoes 
Ammunition may also be acquired by States as a result of the enforcement of 
international arms embargoes. A good example of this is the substantial quantity of 
military propellant which was intercepted by the US Navy on the MV Monchegorsk in 
the Red Sea, while in transit from Iran to Syria, in February 2009. A total of 98 shipping 
containers were seized and were kept in uncovered storage, with direct exposure to 
solar radiation, at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base in Cyprus. The storage location 
was immediately adjacent to the principal electricity power station in Cyprus and is 
shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 –  Overhead image of propellant-filled shipping containers at the Evangelos 
Florakis Naval Base in Cyprus in 2011  24)
 
During the early morning of 11 July 2011, the contents of one of the containers 
spontaneously ignited and subsequently the entire stockpile detonated. Later analysis 
by the NATO Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC) estimated that the 
net explosive content of the stockpile was approximately 480,000 kg. The incident 
resulted in 13 fatalities, 62 injuries and over 3 billion euros of infrastructure damage. 
There were consequences for those politically responsible. Figure 4 shows the ensuing 
devastation following the explosion.
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Figure 4 –  Overhead image of the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base following the 
catastrophic explosion on 11 July 2011  25)
Ammunition management in conflict-affected and developing settings
The risk of diversion and unplanned explosions is especially high in conflict-affected 
environments or in contexts where funding, technical personnel, equipment, or 
physical infrastructure is not available. In the absence of institutional capacity 
and political will, the international community often steps in to provide stockpile 
management support.
Addressing the risks from poorly managed and unsecured ammunition in conflict- 
affected and developing environments is increasingly being addressed in the 
mandates of UN missions. In 2013, UN Security Council resolution 2100, called 
on the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to 
assist the transitional authorities, through training and other support, in weapons 
and ammunition management.  26) Since then, a number of peacekeeping and special 
political missions have been mandated with ammunition management-relevant 
tasks (see Figure 5).
A comprehensive review of weapons and ammunition management-related language 
over the last thirty years in United Nations Security Council documents is provided in 
the United Nations Aide Memoire : Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition 
Management in Decisions of the Security Council (2018).  27)
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Figure 5 –  Major UN peacekeeping and special political missions comprising ammunition 
management activities (as of 2018)
The application of the IATG in conflict-affected settings has proved to be particularly 
challenging. However, international guidance is available. In January 2018, the United 
Nations published the handbook, Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management 
in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context.  28)  This pub-
lication provides UN disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) officers 
with practical guidance regarding arms control operations at both programmatic 
and technical levels, enabling them to understand the technical requirements to 
effectively plan and implement weapons and ammunition management activities.  29)
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3.3  HOW DO THE IATG RELATE TO OTHER UN PROCESSES ?
The IATG have been developed to be compatible with a range of other UN standards, 
including :
• Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) : 
launched in 2012, the MOSAIC framework includes 24 modules that provide 
practical guidance for curbing the illicit trade, uncontrolled proliferation and misuse 
of small arms and light weapons (SALW). MOSAIC is being used in more than 
100 countries to help strengthen national capacities on SALW management.
 
For more information on MOSAIC, go to : 
www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/mosaic/ 
• International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). These are the standards by which 
all UN mine action operations are conducted. IMAS is compatible with the IATG, 
particularly in the areas of stockpile reduction and the storage, transportation 
and handling of explosives in demining operations.
 
For more information on IMAS, go to :  
www.mineactionstandards.org/ 
• Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards 
(IDDRS). Completed in 2006 and undergoing a substantive updating in 2019, 
the IDDRS provide a set of policies, guidelines and procedures to support all 
aspects of DDR operations in peacekeeping contexts, including disarmament. 
The Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR is currently revising the IDDRS to 
reflect the evolution of DDR practice.
 
For more information on the IDDRS go to :  
www.unddr.org/iddrs.aspx 
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UN arms control process
The IATG should be situated within broader, applicable arms control process. The 
following section provides an overview of some of the major arms control mechanisms 
and instruments, highlighting their scope and the degree to which they deal with 
the issues of ammunition management.
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
In September 2015, UN Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. SDG 16 dedicated to peace, justice and strong institutions is a natural 
entry point for national ammunition management. Improving ammunition security 
and safety is a key measure to curbing illicit arms flows (encapsulated in SDG 16.4) 
and preventing unplanned explosions.
Regulating arms and ammunition can reduce violence against women 
and girls in both public and private spheres.
 Effective ammunition management mitigates the risk of storage depots 
accidentally exploding in populated areas. These explosions, when they 
occur, are humanitarian disasters that lead to death, injury, economic loss, 
displacement and destruction of infrastructure and private property.
Strengthening the institutional capacities of States to better control 
arms and ammunition helps prevent conflict, violence, terrorism and 
crime.
The Secretary-General’s Disarmament Agenda
The Secretary-General’s Disarmament Agenda, Securing Our Future   30) provides 
steps to be taken in order to ensure human, national and collective security in the 
current global climate. The issue of ammunition is covered by the agenda, especially 
as it relates to achieving above SDG 11 and 16. Action 22 of the implementation 
plan for the agenda refers directly to ammunition management. 
 
For more information on the UN Secretary-General’s disarmament agenda, 
visit : www.un.org/disarmament/sg-agenda/en/index.html 
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Arms Trade Treaty
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a multilateral instrument that regulates the international 
transfer of conventional arms. The treaty establishes legally binding commitments 
governing international tradeof conventional arms, including Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW). Some of the ATT provisions also apply to ammunition and their 
parts and components.
The IATG are relevant to the ATT in terms of preventing and addressing transfer 
diversion.
Firearms Protocol
The purpose of the Firearms Protocol is to“promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation 
among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing 
of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition”.  31)
 What is marking ?  
The IATG define marking as the application of marks – including colours, 
descriptive text and symbols – to munitions, parts and components thereof, 
and associated packaging, for the purpose of identifying, among other 
things, their role, operational features, and age ; and the potential hazards 
posed by those munitions.  32)
 What is the purpose of marking ?  
The ammunition and packaging should be appropriately marked to provide 
information to enable the explosives to be stored, handled and transported 
correctly ; packaging is a key safety measure.  33)
In the context of the Firearms Protocol, if ammunition is recovered from 
a crime scene or in the course of illicit manufacturing or trafficking, its 
markings can be used by the investigating State to search its own records 
and as a basis for an international request for the tracing of that firearm or 
ammunition.  34) 
The Wassenaar Arrangement
The Wassenaar Arrangement was established to contribute to regional and inter-
national security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility 
in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. It covers 
small arms and light weapons and related ammunition.
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3.4  REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS
Table 2 provides an overview of the main international and regional regulatory agree-
ments and frameworks relevant to ammunition management and control.
Table 2 – International and regional regulatory frameworks relevant to 
ammunition management
Framework Date Legal status
Adoption Entry into force
Legally 
binding
Non-legally 
binding
International
2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (universal adherence)
2015 
ATT 2013 2014 
CCW Protocol V 2003 2006 
UN Firearms Protocol 2000 2005 
Regional
CARICOM Crime and  
Security Strategy
2013 
Khartoum Declaration 2012 
CARICOM Declaration on SALW 2011 
ECCAS Convention 
(Kinshasa Convention)
2010 2017 
EU Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP
2008 2008 
ECOWAS Convention 2006 2009 
EU Strategy to combat illicit 
accumulation and trafficking of 
SALW and their ammunition
2005 
Nairobi Protocol 2004 2005 
OSCE Document on Stockpiles of 
Conventional Ammunition
2003 
SADC Protocol 2001 2004 
Nadi Framework 2000 
CIFTA 1997 1998 
04
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4.1 RISK MANAGEMENT
Ammunition presents an inherent risk, and inadequately managed ammunition 
stockpiles present an even greater risk by threatening public safety and the security 
of the respective State.
 What is risk ?  
The IATG define risk as the combination of the probability of occurrence of 
harm and the severity of that harm, as represented by the following 
equation : risk = likelihood x consequence  35)
Consequently, ammunition stockpile risk management is focused on the safety and 
security of ammunition and ammunition-related activities towards ;
• preventing unplanned explosion events and
• mitigating harm (in the event an unplanned explosion does occur) to surrounding 
exposures, which might be military assets, equipment, facilities, workers, the 
public, etc.
With safety and security in mind, the IATG lay out an integrated process for managing 
risks from stockpile ammunition and ammunition-related activities. This process 
has been configured to give a State the ability to progressively reduce risk as more 
resources become available to them. 36) This section will explain basic IATG risk 
management concepts, its main components, and how these components work 
together in an integrated manner.
What is risk management ?
The IATG state that risk management should be seen by States as a fundamental 
preventative measure to support safe conventional ammunition stockpile manage-
ment. Additionally, they state that decisions based on more complete knowledge 
can be made if the likelihood of an explosives accident can be considered as well 
as the consequences. 37)
 What is risk management ?  
The IATG broadly define risk management as the complete risk-based 
decision-making process. 38)
From the above, it can be surmised that risk management is all about risk reduction, 
risk management and risk acceptance ; this refers to those actions taken to lessen 
the probability, negative consequences, or both, associated with a particular risk. 
Risk management strives to reduce risk to a tolerable level based on the current 
values of society and as determined by the appropriate national authority.
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 What is tolerable risk ? 
 It is risk, which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of 
society.  39)
Civilian casualties associated with an unplanned explosion event, and 
diversion of ammunition from a national stockpile, are considered highly 
unacceptable and represent a threshold for tolerable risk.
Expanding further, as described in the IATG 02.10, risk management (accounting 
for both safety and security) can generally be described as a process used to :
• Identify all potential or known stockpile hazards or threats, such as unsafe ammu-
nition, lack of or application of improper quantity distances, improper operating 
procedures, untrained personnel, inadequate funding, the lack of surveillance, 
open storage and inadequate structures, inadequate security ;
• Assess and analyze these hazards to identify potential consequences, such as 
fatalities, injuries, or damage, potential for theft, diversion, or other illicit activities ;
• Eliminate or mitigate overall risk (probability or consequences or both) to tolerable 
levels using techniques and engineering principles included in the IATG) ; and
• Identify remaining or residual risk to present to the appropriate national authority 
and to communicate it to affected individuals.
Why is risk management necessary ?
The nature of ammunition and explosives with their potential for unplanned, violent 
reaction makes a risk-based approach to conventional ammunition management 
necessary. 40)
 As discussed in section 2.1, the risk from ammunition stockpiles is 
illustrated by the number of Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites that 
have occurred in the recent past.  41) These explosive events, in terms of the 
large numbers of casualties and lost assets and capabilities, have been the 
catalyst for UNGA involvement and the development of the IATG and its 
implementing programme – UN SaferGuard.
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Even with an effective risk management process implemented, ammunition and 
ammunition-related activities can never be absolutely safe. This is an inevitable fact 
of life, which does not mean that all efforts to ensure safety are not undertaken ; 
it just means that absolute safety cannot to be proved with 100% confidence. 42) 
Conversely, having either a deficient or no risk management process implemented, 
provides for significantly less confidence in the level of safety, potentially 0% if 
there is no process at all. And, as detailed in a number of IATG modules, there are 
any number of factors that, if not monitored and managed, will actually increase 
the probability of an unplanned explosion event.
Consequently, an effective and integrated risk management process can help a 
State in :
• Keeping its ammunition stockpile safe, secure, functional and available for when 
it is needed ;
• Assuring the best value-for-money with regards full utilization of a critical and 
expensive commodity ; and
• Keeping ammunition-associated processes and operations safe and secure.
What does a comprehensive risk management system look like ?
Risk-based approaches take many forms, vary in degrees of complexity and are 
constantly evolving. For those with limited resources and capabilities, simple risk 
management techniques and tools can help define risks related to unplanned 
explosion events and prevent diversion, so that decision makers clearly understand 
the risks they are accepting and the consequences of their decisions.
Additionally, there is a great deal of guidance and information available to help a State 
establish a framework on which to develop and build its risk management processes. 43)
 The IATG’s integrated risk management approach (applicable for both 
safety and security) is based on the generic risk management process given 
in ISO guide 51, 44) with a special emphasis on activities associated with 
conventional ammunition storage. 
A critical element of stockpile management planning and operations is the implemen-
tation of an effective and integrated risk management system. As applied within 
the IATG, integration means that risk management will be :
• Supported by all leadership levels, supporting organizations, and workers ;
• Well defined and institutionalized in a State’s risk management policy and 
implementation documents which include responsibilities and requirements ;
• Addressed in every aspect of all stockpile management activities and related func-
tions, such as equipment, facilities, processes, training and operating procedures.
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IATG 02.10 describes the IATG’s over-arching risk management approach and each 
of its four major components :
• Risk Assessment,
• Risk Reduction,
• Risk Acceptance, and
• Risk Communication.
As can be seen in Figure 6, Risk Assessment is then further broken out into Risk 
Analysis and Risk and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) Evaluation, and 
Risk Analysis is yet further broken out to Hazard Identification and Analysis and 
Risk Estimation.
Figure 6 – Risk management structure
Risk Management
Risk Assessment
Risk Analysis
Hazard Identication and Analysis
Risk Estimation
Risk and ALARP Evaluation
Risk Reduction
Risk Acceptance
Risk Communication
Risk management has been integrated throughout the IATG’s  
requirements and guidance and is considered to be a complete risk-based 
decision-making process. 
 What is ALARP ?  
The IATG use the term “As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)” to 
identify the lowest amount of risk that can be accepted by a national 
authority. The ALARP level should be determined through a quantitative risk 
assessment, based on technical and explosives engineering judgement.
 What is a quantitative risk assessment ?  
According to the IATG, a quantitative risk assessment is a method of 
estimating and compounding the approximate probability of an accidental 
explosion with that of fatalities and other losses. This enables professional 
judgement to be applied as to whether or not the risk meets the ALARP 
principle. 45)
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Figure 7 shows an overview of the risk evaluation process. It shows the process 
for arriving at a decision or a desired result by repeating rounds of analysis or a 
cycle of operations. The objective is to bring the desired decision or result closer 
to implementation with each repetition (iteration).
Figure 7 – The risk evaluation process
Start
Denition of intended 
use and reasonably 
foreseen misuse
Hazard identication
Risk estimation
Risk evaluation
Is tolerable risk
achieved?
Risk reduction
Stop
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IATG 02.10 introduces the concept of risk management and explains the activities 
necessary to ensure appropriate risk management within a conventional ammunition 
management system. It concentrates primarily on the risks to the civilian community 
from ammunition storage but also provides guidance on risk estimation techniques 
that may be used for other functional areas of conventional ammunition stockpile 
management. 46) The following text further expands on how risk management and 
its implementation have been simplified, in terms of providing a State with the 
means to gradually and incrementally improve stockpile-related activities as their 
resources and capabilities allow :
• The IATG are structured in an integrated risk management process frame-
work. The way this is accomplished is by identifying specific tasks and activities 
in each module for the particular stockpile management topic area addressed by 
that module and for a particular Risk Reduction Process Level (RRPL). Additionally, 
where there is a relationship with tasks and activities contained in other IATG 
modules, then reference is made to those other modules. If requirements are 
fully implemented, then risk management associated with that particular topic 
area and for a particular RRPL has been met. However, if requirements are not 
met, then the approach illustrated in Figure 6  47) should be used to mitigate 
risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)  48) and appropriate national 
authority approval obtained for any remaining residual risk.
 A State should have an organization dedicated to conventional ammunition 
management. The basic aim of such an organization should be to make sure 
that stockpile management measures and processes elaborated in the IATG 
are maintained at RRPL1, as a minimum. This will significantly reduce the 
risk of diversion and explosion. Ongoing and gradual improvements 
should be made to the stockpile management infrastructure and processes 
as staff development improves and further resources become available. 49)
 A State can assess the RRPL levels of its ammunition stockpile through use 
of the UN SaferGuard RRPL Checklist 50) which poses a series of questions 
for specific topic areas addressed within the IATG and then, based on 
responses to these questions, determines a calculated weighted score. To 
achieve a given RRPL, a site’s score must meet or exceed the appropriate 
score threshold, and all “critical” questions for the RRPL must be 
satisfactorily answered.
Box 4 provides an extract from IATG 01.20  51) that lists (by module clause) some 
of the tasks and activities associated with RRPL 1. Similar lists are available for 
RRPLs 2 and 3 – related tasks and activities. 52)
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Box 4 – Extract from the Index of Risk Reduction Process Level 1 within the IATG
IATG 
REFERENCE
IATG TITLE CLAUSE CLAUSE TITLE REMARKS
01.50 UN Explosive 
Hazard Classication 
System and Codes
6.1 Hazard Divisions
6.1.1 Fire Divisions
7.2 Ammunition requiring separate 
storage
02.10 Introduction to 
Risk Management 
Principles and 
Processes
8.2.1 Probability estimation of an 
unplanned or undesirable explosive 
event
10 Risk reduction
11 Risk acceptance
12 Risk communication
Annex D Example Qualitative Risk 
Assessment methodology
Annex F Risk management and IATG 
Software
02.50 Fire Safety 5 Principles
6.1 Fire safety plan
7 Fire alarm systems More technical 
systems would 
be Level 2
8 Fire breaks and vegetation
8.2 Fire practices
10.2 Fire signs and symbols
10.3 First aid re ghting appliances (FAFA)
11.1 Unit immediate actions
11.2 Brieng to Senior Fire Officer
Annex C Fire signs
• Using the baseline RRPL lists and the IATG, a State can then develop an action 
plan and goals for reaching its desired end state for the national stockpile and 
with regards to safety and security and adherence to the IATG. Using the IATG’s 
integrated RRPL- based approach, a State can develop, manage and monitor its 
own efforts towards achieving self-identified RRPL goal(s), as their domestic 
skills and resources become available.
 Adherence to the IATG generally means that a conventional ammunition 
stockpile management organization is implementing many components of 
an integrated risk management system. 53)
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4.2 AMMUNITION ACCOUNTING
The ability to rapidly detect inadvertent inaccuracy, loss, theft, leakage or diversion is 
a key control measure of effective sto ckpile management, particularly as ineffective 
stock accounting significantly increases the risk of diversion. 54)
 Ammunition accounting has an important role in supporting the following : 
•  Security. Accounting supports national and international efforts to 
eliminate ammunition-related diversion and illicit criminal activities.
•  Stockpile management. Accounting supports processes used to manage 
and monitor ammunition safety (prevent unplanned explosion events), 
functionality (performs within required parameters), and serviceability 
(safe to issue).
•  Through Life Management (TLM) of ammunition. Accounting provides 
important information to support TLM-related functional elements 
(planning, procurement, stockpile management, and disposal).
This section will address each of these areas and will also explain what accounting 
is, why it is necessary, where it fits within a stockpile management organizational 
structure, and its role and responsibilities. Other areas, such as accounting system 
methodology, inventory management, importance of accuracy, stocktaking and audits, 
and the value of batch and lot numbers as part of accounting, will also be briefly 
touched on. 
What is ammunition accounting ?
Ammunition accounting is simply the process implemented for monitoring and 
managing the quantities, condition, locations and accuracy of ammunition stocks.
 What is accounting ?  
The IATG describes accounting as the information management systems 
and associated operating procedures that are designed to record, 
numerically monitor, verify, issue and receive ammunition in organizations 
and stockpiles. 55)
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IATG volume 03 specifically addresses the topic of ammunition accounting through 
five modules, 56) described below :
• IATG 03.10 – Inventory management. The importance and value of accounting 
and inventory management are explained in this module, as are its basic elements, 
such as the structure of the accounting and inventory management systems, 
responsibilities, assignment and monitoring of ammunition locations, issue, 
receipt, assignment of condition codes, planning for procurement and calculations 
of requirements, and associated financial accounting.
• IATG 03.20 – Lotting and batching. This module introduces the concept of 
lotting and batching ; describes when lot and batch numbers should be used, 
how they are assigned, and what information should be derived from a lot or 
batch number.
• IATG 03.30 – Import and export of ammunition. This module discusses principles 
that have been internationally agreed for national controls over international 
ammunition transfers.
• IATG 03.40 – End-users and end-use of internationally transferred ammunition. 
This module provides guidance for the development and implementation of 
effective and accountable national controls over the end-users and end-uses of 
internationally transferred ammunition.
• IATG 03.50 – Tracing of ammunition. This module discusses basic principles 
of tracing as well as principles for tracing of illicit ammunition.
The focus of this section is primarily on accounting and inventory systems, as 
detailed in IATG 03.10, and reference will only be made to other IATG volume 03 
modules as necessary.
Why is ammunition accounting necessary ?
Effective accounting processes and procedures provide the means for monitoring 
and managing ammunition condition, location, safety and security and to help 
identify errors, loss and theft and prevent diversion and illicit activities. They can also 
provide a strong deterrent and a control measure to help prevent ammunition theft, 
diversion and illicit activities, because the probability of being caught is increased.
  
Ineffective stockpile accounting systems significantly increase the risk of 
unplanned explosions and diversion. 57)
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Additionally, accounting is important in that it supports the operational readiness 
of the ammunition stockpile to meet national and organizational requirements, 
by providing critical information to support stockpile management processes and 
decisions, such as policy, strategic and operational planning, budgeting, training, 
procurement and disposal. Table 3 illustrates how accounting supports stockpile 
management and can help address specific broad areas of concern.
Table 3 – Importance of accounting in supporting stockpile management activities
Activity Concern Role of accounting process  58)
Matching 
stockpile 
to national 
requirements
• Large quantities of improper, 
obsolete, surplus, unserviceable 
and unsafe ammunition stocks 
may result in misrepresented or 
incorrect operational capabilities
• Valuable and limited resources 
being misused or mis-directed
• Incorrect resource planning 
leading to incorrect procurement
• Gives visibility over the entire 
stockpile in terms of status and 
availability
• Provides the ability to assess if 
it contains the right types and 
quantities of ammunition to 
meet necessary strategic and 
operational requirements
Security • Diverted stocks can be used for 
illicit activities domestically and 
internationally
• Stocks diverted from their 
intended purposes can impact 
operational readiness
• Replacement stocks can be very 
costly and may require long lead 
times to procure
• Provides visibility to 
ammunition types, quantities 
and locations
• Provides ability to quickly 
identify lost, stolen, damaged, 
misused, or diverted 
ammunition
• Supports investigations into 
illicit activities in order to take 
appropriate actions
Safety and 
operational 
readiness 
• All ammunition has a shelf life 59) 
that is finite, and its safety and 
serviceability (functional and safe 
to issue) can be influenced by 
many factors
• Unsafe ammunition increases 
the possibility of an unplanned 
explosion event
• Unserviceable ammunition 
degrades capabilities
• Provides visibility to 
ammunition types, quantities 
and locations
• Gives visibility to the condition 
and quality of ammunition 
stocks
• Supports programmes aimed 
at monitoring and managing 
safety and serviceability
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Activity Concern Role of accounting process
Disposal • Disposal ammunition may present 
a greater risk for diversion or an 
unplanned explosion event
• Disposal ammunition may need 
to be managed and monitored 
as it may still require safety or 
serviceability-related tests to be 
performed
• Ageing propellants present 
greater risk of an unplanned 
explosion event
• Provides visibility to disposal-
related ammunition types, 
quantities, conditions and 
locations
• Disposal ammunition needs to 
be accounted for until removed 
from the stockpile as a result 
of a disposal action (export or 
demilitarization)
• Supports programmes aimed 
at monitoring and managing 
safety (demilitarization 
accounts) and serviceability 
(export accounts)
Forecasting and 
procurement 
planning 
• Valuable and limited resources 
being misused or mis-directed
• Incorrect resource forecasting 
leading to incorrect planning and 
procurement
• Gives visibility to the entire 
stockpile in terms of status and 
availability
• Supports the planning and 
forecasting of ammunition 
needs, as well as any 
associated costs for 
procurement, stockpiling and 
storage, and disposal
What does a comprehensive ammunition accounting system look like ?
Ammunition accounting and inventory are important parts of any national ammunition 
management system and necessary for the safety and security of the national stock-
pile. Having dedicated organizations, with the necessary authority and responsibility 
for ammunition accounting and inventory functions, within the ammunition stockpile 
management system, is important in terms of their effectiveness and ability to 
support national stockpile management efforts. To advise States in this area, the IATG 
have proposed an ammunition stockpile management system (with supporting 
component organizations), 60) as shown in Table 4. Organizational structure is 
discussed further in section 4.2 and 4.5.
Table 3 – continued
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Table 4 – Ammunition stockpile management system components  61)
Organisations Remarks
Ammunition stockpile 
management department
• Usually at Ministry of Defence/Interior or Service (Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Police etc) level.
Ammunition storage units • Subordinate to the stockpile management organisation.
• Usually the major ammunition storage depots.
Ammunition technical 
inspection units
• Subordinate to the stockpile management organisation 
and co-located with the major ammunition storage depots.
Ammunition training unit • Subordinate to the stockpile management organisation.
• Should be co-located with a major ammunition depot.
Ammunition inspectorate • Subordinate to, and reports directly to, the stockpile 
management organisation.
• Independent of other ammunition units.
• Consists of ammunition technical staff to ensure the 
safety and condition of ammunition within user units.
User units • User units fall under the operational chain of command.
Within the ammunition stockpile management system structure, responsibility for 
accounting and inventory functions should fall directly under ammunition storage 
units, 62) which report directly to the ammunition stockpile management organization. 
Independent oversight and inspections will be conducted by the ammunition 
inspectorate. 63)
Regarding ammunition accounting methodology, IATG 03.10 recommends that 
accounting principles be derived from generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), which provide a widely accepted set of rules, conventions, standards and 
procedures for primarily reporting and recording financial information. However, 
the requirements for recording transaction activity and stock levels are equally 
applicable to ammunition as to any other commodity or process. 64)
 What are the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) ?  
GAAP are used by a variety of countries and are being integrated into a 
range of new international financial reporting standards and international 
accounting standards that are developed and implemented by an 
independent organization called the International Accounting Standards 
Board. 65)
04
 —
 I
AT
G
 m
od
ul
es
 s
um
m
ar
y 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
51 |
As indicated in Table 3, the output of accounting plays a critical role in supporting 
effective stockpile management. This requires that the quality of accounting-related 
information be :  66)
• Objective – based on stock checks, audits, inspections and transactions.
• Material – relevant and complete in order to provide a true and fair view for 
decision-making purposes.
• Consistent – measured in the same manner, using consistent principles.
• Prudent – uses the best methods.
With regard to the accounting systems and processes themselves, either manual 
or computer systems would be acceptable :  67)
• Manual systems are labour intensive and time consuming and the transmission of 
information between higher levels of hierarchy and accounting and storage units 
is slow, but they have proven capability and are simple to use when individuals 
are appropriately trained.
• Computerized systems are more efficient and capable, but are expensive to 
develop and usually specifically designed for a particular ammunition stockpile 
management organization. These systems are equally reliable as the manual 
systems on the accuracy of the data entered into them. An advantage is that 
they can be directly linked between the stockpile management organization and 
the ammunition accounting and storage units, thereby reducing the requirement 
for reporting of stock levels, as instant visibility is possible.
 The accounting systems and processes selected (either manual or 
computerized) will be based on a State’s needs and its available capabilities 
and resources, taking into consideration the range and complexity of the 
national stockpile and ammunition-related activities performed. Different 
types of ammunition will have different safety and security requirements, 
and more complex activities, such as maintenance, research, production 
and demilitarization will introduce other aspects that may have to be 
managed by accounting and inventory systems and processes.
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Accounting system structure. A State’s ammunition accounting system should 
be structured to keep accurate records (by specific type, quantity, lot and/or batch 
number and exact location), for the following stages of an ammunition item’s life cycle : 68)
• On manufacture ;
• On initial testing ;
• During transportation and shipment ;
• In depot storage ;
• On transfer to user units ;
• During storage at user units ;
• In case of loss or theft ;
• When used ;
• When returned to ammunition depots ;
• When repaired or modified ;
• When subjected to surveillance or in-service proof ; and
• When destroyed or demilitarized. 
 Tracking ammunition lot and batch numbers as part of inventory 
management makes ammunition readily identifiable and locatable and 
supports efforts to maintain safe and serviceable ammunition stocks.
Inventory management. A fundamental component of the accounting system is its 
inventory management system, which should ensure that the type of ammunition 
stockpile is clearly defined and that detailed technical information on the quantity, 
location and condition of the ammunition itself (by specific type), is readily available. 69) 
Inventory management falls naturally among the responsibilities of the ammunition 
storage unit. See Table 4.
Visibility of the entire ammunition inventory and associated equipment should be 
available to the ammunition stockpile management organization, regardless of where 
the ammunition is located. Table 4 identifies an ammunition inspectorate, and it is 
this organization that has the responsibility of assessing inventory accountability 
and status, conducting regular (annual) unit ammunition inspections to ensure the 
safety in storage at unit level, to assess the technical condition of the ammunition 
in unit storage, and to advise units and formation headquarters on ammunition safety 
and technical issues. 70)
The inventory management, including specifics on related activities is addressed 
in IATG 03.10. 71)
Accuracy of ammunition accounts. Inventory accuracy is extremely important for 
the reasons previously mentioned. The IATG caution that no ammunition storage 
organization is likely to be able to achieve 100% accuracy in its ammunition accounts. 72) 
Organizations claiming 100% accuracy of ammunition accounts should be viewed 
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with suspicion, as at the very least it is an indication that they do not understand 
ammunition depot processes ; at worst it means that they have ineffective stockpile 
management processes, as errors cannot be detected down to lot or batch level, 
and therefore safety in storage or use may have been compromised. 73)
 What is a stack ?  
A stack is the amount of ammunition that is contained within a particular 
grid locator base within an explosive storehouse. This may range from a 
single ammunition box within a ground level unit of space (UOS), to a block 
of many pallets stored vertically over a number of particular ground level 
UOS. 74) For planning purposes, storage space for palletized stores is 
calculated in UOS. 75) 
The use of stack tally cards supports accurate ammunition accounting, assists in 
stocktaking and deters theft. Each stack of ammunition should have a tally card(s) 
attached to it that records the following information for that particular stack : 76)
• Grid locator reference ;
• Explosive storehouse number ;
• Full description of ammunition ;
• Ammunition descriptive asset code number (or similar asset code system) ;
• Lot and/or batch number (a separate card should be used for each lot and/or 
batch number) ;
• Ammunition condition code ; and
• A record of transactions (for that stack by quantity, lot/batch number and date ; 
and the issue or receipt voucher reference for each transaction).
Figure 8 gives an example of such a card using IATG Form 03.10 and identifies the 
type of information that should be given on it. 77)
Figure 8 – Example of a Stack Tally Card
Date
Issue/Receipt 
Voucher Number
Received Issued Balance Signature Name
Grid Locator 
Reference
01.mars.12 XY-1011 230,4 230,4 B Smith Bob Smith C6, C7
15 May 12 XY-1056 30,4 200 J Brown John Brown C6, C7
1 June 12 XY-1102 2 202 B Smith Bob Smith C6, C7
Ammunition Description Round 9mm Ball Lot/Batch IMI 10/09 009
Condition Code A1 Remarks
Ammunition Stack Tally Card
IATG Form 03.10
ESH  B3 ADAC 12201-02
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Stocktaking and audits. Stocktaking is an essential process in supporting the 
accuracy of ammunition accounts by identifying discrepancies, loss or theft. It means 
that trained staff, who fully understand the way that ammunition and its packaging is 
marked, should physically count and record the ammunition in each storage location.
 A fundamental principle of effective stocktaking is that staff are not provided 
with a copy of what the ammunition account shows for each storage 
location. It is only the reconciliation between the ammunition account and 
the stocktaking record for each storage location that is important.
 Stocktaking should take place at least every three months, but for large 
stockpiles of ammunition a continuous “rolling” stock check may need to be 
implemented. 78)
Lotting and batching. Ammunition and explosives may deteriorate or become 
damaged, with the resultant effect that they may fail to function as designed or may 
become dangerous, leading to an unplanned explosion event. It is therefore critical, 
through the accounting system, that the location of specific items of ammunition 
and explosives be rapidly identified in order that the appropriate remedial action can 
be taken.
 What is a lot ?  
The IATG define a lot as a predetermined quantity of ammunition or 
components which is as homogeneous as possible and, under similar 
conditions, may be expected to give uniform performance. A lot would 
normally be manufactured from the same raw materials, using the same 
production technique and in the same production run. 79) A lot number is a 
number allocated to a lot which uniquely identifies that lot. 80)
 What is a batch ?  
A batch is defined by the IATG as a discrete quantity of ammunition which 
is assembled from two or more lotted components (one of which will be 
the primary governing component), is as homogeneous as possible and, 
under similar conditions, may be expected to give uniform performance. 81) 
Within the batch a number of sub-batches may be found. A batch number is 
a number allocated to a batch which uniquely identifies that batch. 82)
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The assignment of lot or batch numbers is the method used to accomplish this, 
as the numbers distinguish and identify like items that were manufactured at the 
same time. Items with the same batch or lot number are generally expected to 
have the same properties throughout their lifetime, so having such information 
allows better safety and functional management of the stockpile and provides the 
ability to quickly identify and locate, by their lot or batch number, unsafe or suspect 
ammunition, to better manage risk.
 IATG module 03.20 introduces the concept of lotting and batching of 
ammunition, and proposes a system that can be used to support the safe, 
effective and efficient management of ammunition. 83) Lotting and batching 
is also important for stockpile accounting and allows for timely and reliable 
identification of diversions through loss or theft. 84)
4.3  EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES : FIELD AND TEMPORARY CONDITIONS
In order to ensure the safety and security of stockpiles, ammunition should be 
stored in purpose- built ammunition depots. However, in certain circumstances – 
such as those relating to military operations or national security threats 85) – there 
might be a need for short-term storage of ammunition under field conditions. The 
requirements and issues for consideration in field storage and temporary storage 
are covered in IATG 04.10 and IATG 04.20, respectively. This section provides an 
overview of measures necessary to ensure safe, secure and efficient field and 
temporary storage of ammunition.
 Ammunition should not be stored under field conditions for more than one 
year, after such time it should be transferred to temporary or permanent 
storage facilities. 86)
What is field storage of ammunition ?
 What is field storage ? 
According to the IATG, the term field storage covers measures necessary for 
safe, effective and efficient ammunition storage during periods when 
ammunition is deployed from ammunition depots to support military 
operations, usually abroad. 87) 
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Field storage should be considered as a short-term measure, necessary for storing 
ammunition in support of deployed military operations. Once military operations 
have concluded, ammunition should either be returned to long-term storage or 
stored in accordance with the more stringent temporary storage requirements 
contained within IATG 04.20. The requirements for field storage are not based 
solely on the matter of explosive safety, but include other considerations, such as 
stock preservation through tactical dispersal ; the requirement to provide timely and 
effective support to ongoing military operations ; and the need for logistic efficiency 
and flexibility.
 What is a Field Storage Area ?  
According to the IATG, a Field Storage Area (FSA) is a plot of land or area 
used for storing ammunition and explosives necessary to support military 
operations. Depending on the military requirements, multiple FSAs might 
be necessary. The number of FSA are determined by, 1) the quantity and 
type of ammunition required for operations, 2) the need for at least 
two-point dispersion to protect stocks, and 3) the need to store incompatible 
munitions separately. Each FSA should contain no more than 5,000 tonnes 
of ammunition and explosives. 88)
Ammunition necessary for military operations should be stored within a designated 
Field Storage Area (FSA). The quantity of ammunition and explosives held in any 
operational FSA shall be limited to the amount necessary to support the military 
mission. Similarly, the Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) per storage site should be 
kept as low as practically possible, consistent with the mission and the available 
quantity distances. 89)
 Field storage of ammunition for prolonged periods of time is not 
recommended, as stock will likely be exposed to the full effects of the 
climate. In hot regions, direct exposure of stock stored in shipping 
containers to solar heat will raise temperatures to levels which may cause 
energetic fillings based on TNT and white phosphorous to melt. Daily 
temperature fluctuations of ammunition will also reduce shelf life. 90) 
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How to set up and operate safe and secure field storage
During field operations, ammunition has to be readily available. This implies that, 
when it comes to field storage, a balance has to be found between safety and 
security concerns and tactical requirements. For instance, field operations often 
require vehicles to be loaded with their full combat loads of ammunition and similar 
quantities to be carried on logistics vehicles. While this ensures operational flexibility, 
it also increases the risk that an explosive event can occur (Box 5). It is thus essential 
that the risk is properly analyzed and accepted for field storage of ammunition.
A formal risk assessment is the first step that should be taken to ensure the safe and 
secure field storage of ammunition. The risk assessment should be completed by a 
competent technical authority and be carried out in accordance with the principles 
contained within IATG 02.10. Moreover, the force commander should be informed 
of the risk, particularly if it involves an increased risk to the general public. 91)
 Where possible, steps should be taken to separate vehicles containing high 
explosives so that a fire in one does not result in a prompt spread to others. 
Stocks of ammunition stored in bulk are invariably best stored separately 
from personnel and vehicles and the prudent use of improvised barricades, 
constructed by military engineers, should be considered.
Box 5 – Explosion at Camp Doha, Kuwait
The accidental explosion shown in Figure 9 which occurred at Camp Doha, Kuwait, on 
11 July 1991 is a good example of what can go wrong when a fire occurs in a combat 
vehicle loaded with ammunition. At that time, the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 
had all of its combat vehicles loaded with ammunition and about an equal amount of 
ammunition was ground loaded in shipping containers. A fire was started by a defective 
heater in an M992 ammunition carrier which was fully loaded with 155 mm artillery 
ammunition. The vehicle exploded and the fire spread to consume the majority of the 
vehicles and ammunition stored within the compound. The result of the accident was 
the complete loss of 102 vehicles, and over 50 US and coalition personnel were injured. 
The value of the loss of the ammunition alone was placed at $15 million. 92)
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Figure 9 – Effects of the accidental explosion at Camp Doha, Kuwait, July 1991 93)
The next step in setting up field storage of ammunition is determining the location 
of the FSA. In selecting sites for an FSA it is essential that a variety of factors are 
considered. IATG 04.10, paragraph 6.3, provides a detailed overview of the various 
factors and relevant considerations. However, some of the most pertinent aspects 
to be considered include : 94)
• Physical location. The FSA should be sufficiently isolated so that it does not pose 
a hazard to other critical infrastructure such as airfields, hospitals and other 
logistics installations. The ground needs to be capable of withstanding the passage 
of substantial military vehicles and should be free from hazards such as oil and 
gas pipelines or storage facilities. Within the FSA sufficient space should be 
allocated for administrative facilities, turning circuits for large trucks and to allow 
one-way traffic, if possible.
• Stock dispersion. Sufficient space should be available for the adequate dispersal 
of stock such that an explosion at one does not spread to another ; two-point 
stock dispersal is also required for all critical ammunition types.
• Access to transport infrastructure. The FSA should be served by a transport 
infrastructure, which allows easy access to the ports, airfields and operational 
units it serves.
• Security. The requirements for security and dispersion may appear to be mutually 
exclusive. Where possible, ammunition should be stored with cover from view 
and in areas where unauthorized access can be denied.
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The risk of an explosion with field storage of ammunition is significantly higher than 
for peacetime storage in purpose-built facilities. The explosive safety of ammunition 
might be undermined for a variety of reasons, including enemy action with direct, 
indirect and air-delivered weapons, sabotage, and increased risk of fire due to multiple 
movements of ammunition and proximity to military vehicles. Measures – such as 
quantity and separation distance and aggregation and mixing rules – can ensure 
higher explosive safety of field storage ammunition.
• Quantity and separation distances. Ammunition stored in field storage conditions 
is vulnerable to fire whether started deliberately or by accident. The maintenance 
of appropriate quantity distances between field storage sites (FSS) ensures that 
an accident at one FSS does not spread promptly to others. IATG 04.10, para. 
7.4.1, recommends that the following simplified Inside Quantity Distances (IQD) 
shown as Table 5 be applied to FSS.
Table 5 – IATG-recommended distances between field storage sites
Hazard Division Factor Minimum IQD for Hazard Division
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
1.1 Normal 200 m 100 m 100 m 100 m
1.1 Barricaded 100 m 100 m 100 m 100 m
1.1 Vital stock 300 m 100 m 100 m 100 m
1.2 Normal 100 m 100 m 100 m 100 m
1.3 Normal 100 m 100 m 100 m 50 m
1.3 Propellants 200 m 100 m 100 m 100 m
1.4 Normal 100 m 100 m 50 m 25 m
• Aggregation and mixing of stock. The standard Compatibility Group mixing rules 
for the storage of ammunition should be applied to field storage. 95) Priority should 
be given to the separate storage of ammunition containing white phosphorous 
(Compatibility Group H) and ammunition containing hazardous liquid propellants 
(Compatibility Group L). It is preferable that missiles in a propulsive state are stored 
in a barricaded storage site, with warheads pointing away from other stocks.
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One of the principal disadvantages of field storage of ammunition is that stock is 
more exposed to the environment and will deteriorate at a far faster rate than when 
stored in conventional storage facilities. A number of measures can be put in place 
to ensure the protection of field storage of ammunition, including :
• Protection of stock from environmental factors. The environment has a 
very significant impact on ammunition which can be damaged by exposure to 
extremes of temperature. 96) At temperatures below 0º C rocket motors may 
become brittle thus more prone to cracking when handled. High temperatures 
may cause energetic materials to migrate into fuze wells and large rocket grains 97) 
to become deformed.
• Barricades. Barricades 98) serve two important functions : they prevent hazards 
entering the site from outside and also, when placed between individual stock 
holding sites, prevent a fire or explosion at one site spreading to other sites. 
Effective short-term barricading can be constructed using combat engineering 
earth-moving machinery. Longer- term solutions may be implemented using 
ballast-filled containers, which may be stacked to the required height. For field 
storage it is preferable that ground is selected that provides natural barricades 
and undulating terrain can be used to good effect.
• Fire safety. Fire safety measures are extremely important and all appropriate 
measures should be taken to prevent an accidental fire. 99) These measures 
include : control of vegetation in proximity to ammunition stocks ; presence of 
suitable firefighting equipment to deal with vehicle fires ; and enforcement of 
contraband procedures, particularly the prevention of smoking within the storage 
locations of the FSA.
• Security. Suitable measures should be taken to prevent unauthorized access 
to ammunition. In large field storage areas this may involve the use of military 
patrols and dogs. 100) Surveillance equipment is only an effective deterrent if it 
is backed up by a quick reaction force.
What is temporary storage of ammunition ?
 What is temporary storage ?  
According to the IATG, ammunition is deemed to be under temporary 
storage conditions when appropriate and safe depot storage infrastructure 
is not available, or when that infrastructure has deteriorated that it provides 
no effective protection to either ammunition stocks or the local civilian 
community. In some circumstances temporary storage conditions may last 
for some time if resources are limited, or unavailable to develop appropriate 
depot storage infrastructure. 101) 
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The IATG recognize that the most appropriate storage for ammunition is within 
properly planned and constructed facilities of the type described in section 4.4 of this 
guide. It is often necessary though, particularly in peace operations and post-conflict 
scenarios, for temporary ammunition storage facilities to be established, where 
ammunition can be stored safely and securely and a limited amount of ammunition 
processing may be conducted. The IATG recommend that ammunition should not 
remain in temporary storage facilities for more than five years. 102)
How to set up and operate a temporary storage site
Temporary ammunition storage, like field storage also requires a balance to be struck 
between the needs to support operations and compliance with safety requirements. 103) 
This is the case, in particular, where full compliance with explosive quantity distances 
cannot be achieved. Where temporary quantity distances are implemented a formal 
Explosion Safety Case should be developed and it should be approved by the 
competent national or military authority. 104)
 What is an Explosion Safety Case ?  
When full compliance with Outside Quantity Distances and Inside Quantity 
Distances is not possible, an Explosion Safety Case (ESC) shall be compiled. 
This is done to ensure that the explosive risk carried is as low as possible, 
does not jeopardise operational capability and that Health and Safety 
requirements, and duty of care responsibilities, are properly considered. 105) 
The factors which should be considered in the selection of a temporary ammunition 
storage area are similar to those used for a field storage area. As the temporary 
storage is likely to be operated for a significantly longer period than a field storage 
area, it is important that the road infrastructure within the storage area is capable of 
withstanding the passage of many vehicles and can also tolerate seasonal variations 
in weather. Temporary ammunition storage areas will also require additional facilities, 
such as a disposal site and a facility to permit the processing of ammunition.
 Explosive safety also has to be ensured when setting up and operating a 
temporary storage site. In practice this involves putting in place effective 
quantity and separation distances and following aggregation and mixing 
rules. 106)
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 Ammunition stored in temporary storage areas is particularly vulnerable to 
fire, and an explosion in one storage location may quickly spread to others. 
It is recommended that the full quantity distances appropriate for 
permanent ammunition storage be implemented if this is feasible. 107) If full 
compliance with quantity distances is not possible then it is recommended 
that each individual store shall hold no more than a 4,000 kg net explosive 
quantity of ammunition. 108) The IATG introduce the concept of a temporary 
distance to distinguish between the quantity distance appropriate for a 
temporary ammunition storage facility and those where full compliance 
with IATG is achieved. 109) 
As with field storage, a number of measures can be implemented to improve stock 
protection of ammunition during temporary storage. These include :  110)
• Protection of stock from environmental factors. The protection of ammunition 
from the extreme effects of climate is even more important than in field storage, 
as stock may be exposed for much longer periods of time. In hot climates it 
may be necessary to institute a policy of ammunition surveillance, and types such 
as tank, artillery and mortar-propelling charges will need to be subject to testing. 111) 
In hot climates the impact of solar heat can be reduced by placing material over the 
stored ammunition, to create shade. If ammunition is stored in shipping containers 
and where local security conditions permit, doors should be opened on hot days 
to permit a flow of cooling air over the stock.
• Barricades. Barricades play an important part in preserving stock and are funda-
mental to ensuring that an explosion at one temporary storage location does 
not result in the prompt initiation of stock at an adjacent location. Use of appropriate 
barriers is particularly important in achieving reduced quantity or temporary 
quantity distances, thus reducing the overall area covered by the ammunition 
storage facility. Effective barriers can be constructed from a variety of locally 
available materials, though care needs to be taken to ensure that the barricade 
is positioned appropriately and that the barricade materials do not contribute to 
a secondary fragmentation hazard. 112)
• Overhead protection. Overhead protection is important in areas where there is 
a threat posed by indirect fire weapons, such as mortars and free flight rockets. 
Overhead protection can also prevent the propagation of an explosion event 
within a site if burning firebrands or ejected munitions are projected from a 
nearby explosives store which has exploded.
• Fire safety. Ammunition in temporary storage areas is more vulnerable to fire 
than that stored in permanent facilities. The fire prevention and control measures 
described for field storage areas should also be implemented for temporary 
storage. Particular attention should be paid to the provision of emergency 
water supplies to facilitate effective firefighting. Water containers should also 
be made available as a precautionary measure adjacent to all locations where 
white phosphorous ammunition items are stored.
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• Lightning protection. Lightning protection systems should certainly be consid-
ered in areas of high lightning incidence or where temporary storage facilities are 
likely to be used for periods in excess of two years. The choice and installation 
of lightning protection systems is a specialist subject which is covered in the 
IATG. 113) Where ammunition is stored in metal shipping containers a degree 
of lightning protection may be obtained from the bonding of the base of the 
container to earth.
• Security. Control of access to temporary ammunition storage facilities is extremely 
important in order to prevent sabotage and theft of stock. The IATG cover a full 
range of security features which can be implemented in temporary storage 
facilities. 114) It is recommended that an effective perimeter fence be implemented 
and that all access to the site is via controlled gates. Ammunition which is 
assessed as being attractive to criminal or terrorist organizations (ACTO) should 
be stored in locked containers. 115)
 The rate of deterioration of ammunition propellants doubles for every 10º C 
rise in temperature. Thus, an artillery propelling charge which may have a 
safe shelf life of 20 years when stored at an ambient temperature of 20º C 
may only have a safe shelf life of 2.5 years when subject to prolonged 
storage temperatures of 60º C. This high temperature is easily reached 
inside shipping containers exposed directly to solar heat in many parts of 
Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia during the summer months. 116)
Given the likely duration for which ammunition will be stored in temporary facilities, 
and the need to undertake some form of ammunition surveillance programme, it 
will be necessary to implement some form of ammunition processing facility at most 
temporary ammunition storage sites. Given the potential hazards associated with 
ammunition processing, the following factors should be considered when planning 
and implementing ammunition process facilities in temporary ammunition sites. 
The Ammunition Process Building (APB) should :
• Be located at a safe distance from other explosive holding sites i.e. at the correct 
Process Building Distance (PBD) ;
• Be located at a safe distance from administrative buildings or other inhabited 
buildings external to the site i.e. at the correct Inhabited Building Distance ;
• Preferably make use of barricades to reduce the effects of an accidental explosion 
within the APB ;
• Be readily accessible to ammunition storage holding locations within the site ;
• Provide suitable environmental protection for staff i.e. is weatherproof and resistant 
to the ingress of dust. 117)
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4.4  EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES : INFRASTRUCTURE AND EQUIPMENT
This section highlights the essential issues which must be considered by States 
in establishing and operating ammunition storage and processing facilities. The 
key considerations when storing high explosives is whether there is a sufficient 
separation distance from the store to people, and whether there is a sufficient 
separation distance between the store and other stores containing explosives. In 
the event of an unplanned explosion it is critical that the civilian population remains 
largely unaffected, and that an explosion at one site does not result in the prompt 
initiation of explosives at other sites.
What are explosives facilities infrastructure and equipment ?
Explosives facilities cover the full range of physical infrastructure which are required 
for the safe storage and processing of ammunition. The development and construc-
tion of ammunition infrastructure is a resource-intensive activity. It is essential to 
plan it carefully to avoid wasting of resources. Achieving safe separation between 
ammunition storage and processing facilities within a site is a prerequisite for 
ensuring that an accidental fire or explosion at one site does not quickly spread 
to adjacent sites, with catastrophic results. Close attention should always be paid 
to inside and outside explosive quantity distances and steps taken to ensure that 
the maximum permitted net explosive quantity of ammunition items stored and 
processed at individual sites is never exceeded.
Equipment used in ammunition facilities should be specifically designed and 
procured for its intended activity. Careful attention should be paid to eliminating 
all possible sources of accidental ignition and new equipment should be introduced 
only after a careful process of safety evaluation.
How to ensure the safety of explosives facilities ?
IATG 05.10 details the general criteria to be applied when selecting sites for 
ammunition storage and processing. 118) The critical factors to be considered when 
evaluating a site are :
• Is there a suitable safeguarded area available to permit acceptable quantities 
of explosives to be stored, and the requirements for a safe Inhabited Building 
Distance (IBD) to be met ?
• Is the safety of the site compromised by the close proximity of another hazardous 
installation, such as a pipeline, industrial or petrochemical facility, or vice versa ?
• Are the individual Explosive Storehouses (ESHs) within the site separated 
sufficiently to achieve a safe Inter-Magazine Distance (IMD) with an acceptable 
ESH explosive content ?
• Does the site have facilities to permit the safe processing of ammunition ?
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• Is there sufficient real estate available to construct and operate a disposal site 
to permit the disposal of unserviceable or unsafe munitions ?
• Is the site secure or can it be secured at acceptable cost ?
• Is the site in a geographically suitable location to meet future requirements for 
operations and training ?
The storage, processing and transportation of ammunition presents inherent risks to 
persons and property, so achieving satisfactory separation between Potential Explosion 
Sites (PESs) and Exposed Sites (ESs) is a prerequisite for the safe operation of any 
ammunition facility. 119) Quantity and separation distances are covered in IATG 02.20. 
In the event of an unplanned explosion the principle effects are air blast and frag-
mentation. Explosive quantity distances define the minimum permissible distance 
between a PES and an ES. Explosive quantity distances provide a relatively 
straightforward mechanism for determining the safe quantity of explosives which 
may be stored or processed at a particular location and take into consideration 
other explosive storing locations (Inside Quantity Distances) and potentially vulnerable 
locations external to the site (Outside Quantity Distances). Arguably, the failure to 
apply explosive quantity distances is the principal cause of damage to infrastructure 
and civilian casualties, resulting from Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites.
 Inside Quantity Distances (IQD). IQD are the minimum distances that should 
be observed between PES and ES that contain explosives. 120) There are two 
types of IQD :
•  Process Building Distance (PBD). The PBD provides a high degree 
of protection against immediate propagation of an explosion in an 
Ammunition Process Building (APB). PBDs represent the minimum 
distances that should be observed between PES and APBs or between 
adjacent APBs ;
•  Inter-Magazine Distance (IMD). The IMD is the minimum distance to be 
observed between a PES and an ES which both store, but not process, 
ammunition.
 Outside Quantity Distance (OQD). 121) OQD is the minimum distance to be 
observed between PES and non-explosive ES. These are generally outside 
the explosives storage and processing area and may affect the civilian 
population. There are three types of OQD :
•  Inhabited Building Distance (IBD). The IBD is the minimum distance to be 
observed between a PES and buildings and locations where members of 
the civilian population live or work. 
•  Vulnerable Building Distance (VBD). The VBD is the minimum distance 
to be observed between a PES and vulnerable buildings such as 
hospitals, schools, glass-clad buildings, and other non-hardened critical 
infrastructure.
•  Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD). The PTRD is the minimum distance 
to be observed between a PES and public traffic routes. 
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Quantity distances have been developed through a process of post-explosion 
assessment, and trials and evaluation over many years. It should be noted that the 
application of quantity distances does not guarantee safety and hazards posed by 
glazing, and buildings of vulnerable construction need also be considered.
Explosives licensing is the process by which the national authority responsible for 
the safety of ammunition storage and processing facilities defines and authorizes the 
maximum quantities of explosives which may be safely stored or processed at a 
particular location. Explosives licensing is covered in IATG 02.30.
It is recommended that the following factors are considered in the development 
of the Explosives Limit Licence (ELL) for each Explosive Storehouse (ESH) or 
Ammunition Process Building (APB) : 122)
• Only an authorized limit of explosives, specified by Hazard Division, should be 
stored at a particular site. This limit should be based on a thorough analysis 
of quantity distance criteria, both Inside Quantity Distance (IQD) and Outside 
Quantity Distance (OQD), from governing Potential Exposion Sites (PESs)  123) and 
Exposed Sites (ESs) ; 124)
• Exposure of the civilian population to an explosive risk shall be avoided as far 
as is reasonably practicable ;
• Any special considerations requiring management or periodic review, should 
be specified on the licence ;
• The number of personnel exposed to a hazard should be specified and that 
person limits should be indicated. This is particularly important for facilities that 
operate with naturally higher levels of risk such as Ammunition Process Buildings 
(APBs) and demilitarization facilities.
Explosives storage and processing facilities pose a potential hazard to personnel and 
property and this hazard, as highlighted by the IBD, could extend beyond the defined 
boundaries of military installations. The process by which civilian development is 
limited in these areas is known as explosives safeguarding. 125) In considering the 
requirements for safeguarding, States need to establish an appropriate national 
technical authority which will represent the government on behalf of all owners 
of explosives facilities nationwide. This authority should be actively involved in the 
implementation of an explosives safeguarding system and include :
• The development of appropriate national legislation that enables national authorities 
to influence future development within the explosion danger area ;
• The development of a consultative (and related appeals) process between the 
national technical authority, local authority responsible for authorizing building 
permission, and the government entity which operates the explosives facility ;
• The development of appropriate procedures to be followed by all parties prior 
to any building permission being granted for development of land within the 
explosion danger area.
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 It is very important that States control development in areas adjacent to 
explosives facilities in order to maintain safety. Unconstrained 
development in areas adjacent to explosives facilities has been a cause of 
significant casualties as a result of unplanned explosions at ammunition 
sites. This is known as Safeguarding. It is recommended that explosive 
safeguarding maps are established and that sites of specific relevance to 
explosive quantity distance calculations which exist outside of the 
safeguarded perimeter are identified. 126)
Examples of effective infrastructure at ammunition storage facilities
The quality and physical location of the explosive storage infrastructure has a signifi-
cant influence on the safety and security of ammunition. Security fences, intrusion 
detection systems and locked doors make unauthorized access to ammunition more 
difficult to achieve. The protection of ammunition from environmental influences 
such as large daytime temperature fluctuations, direct solar heat, humidity, wind and 
rain, is important as these elements can have a direct impact on the physical and 
chemical properties of the ammunition being stored. In short, good quality explosive 
storage infrastructure provides both physical protection from explosions at adjacent 
stores and helps maintain the condition and shelf life of the ammunition for longer 
periods. A variety of types of building are available for the storage of ammunition. 127)
(a) Shipping containers and open stacks of ammunition are the least desirable form 
of explosives storage since little to no protection is afforded from direct exposure to 
sun and resulting fluctuations in store temperature and humidity. 128) Open stacks are 
also critically vulnerable to prompt detonation caused by an accidental explosion at 
a nearby site. Open stacked ammunition, especially if the stacks are located close 
together, could have catastrophic mass explosion implications in the event of an 
accident or attack. Figure 10 shows one example of Kub (SA6 Gainful) surface-to-air 
missiles stored in an open stack. It can be seen that there is no protection from the 
elements or method of preventing the missiles becoming propulsive in the event of 
fire or explosion. A number of light-walled buildings are also visible in the background.
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Figure 10 – Surface-to-air missiles stored in open stacks  129)
(b) Light-structured buildings are constructed of light frangible materials that should 
not produce a great number of dangerous projections when used as a Potential 
Exposion Site (PES). 130) As an Exposed Site (ES), this structure could collapse but 
the debris produced should not initiate explosions. Light-structured buildings are 
preferable to open stacks as they provide environmental protection to ammunition 
stocks and, when protected by a suitable receptor barricade, offer some protection 
to stock from low angle, high- velocity fragments.
 Earth barricades are extremely effective at screening both Exposed Sites 
(ES) and Potential Exposion Sites (PES) from high-velocity fragment attack. 
Barricades need to be built to a sufficient height to protect the structure 
being protected and, in the case of interceptor traverses (i.e. those that 
screen PES), should not contain large debris which could pose an additional 
fragmentation hazard to nearby ES.
(c) A medium-walled building is one constructed of a minimum thickness of 215 mm 
solid or 280 mm cavity masonry walls or 150 mm of reinforced concrete and a 15  mm 
reinforced concrete roof. 131) Figure 11 shows a medium-walled building featuring 
individual compartments to facilitate segregation of ammunition.
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Figure 11 – Medium-walled Explosives Storehouse (ESH)  132)
(d) A heavy-walled structure is one with a minimum of 680 mm thick masonry or 
450 mm thick concrete walls, and a minimum 150 mm reinforced concrete roof. 133) 
A receptor barricade is not generally required because the heavy walls fulfil this 
function.
(e) An earth-covered building is any structure, except an “igloo” type magazine, 
which has a minimum thickness of 600 mm of earth on the roof and earth cover to 
the sides and rear walls. 134) Barricades should be provided to shield doors and walls 
that are not earth covered and face a PES.
(f) An earth-covered magazine or “igloo” type Explosives Storehouse (ESH) 
is an explosive storehouse with earth cover and a structure and doors designed to 
resist blast and high-velocity fragments, so that the contents will not be initiated or 
seriously damaged at the required Inter-Magazine Distance (IMD). 135)  The supporting 
structure for the earth cover may be constructed of corrugated steel and reinforced 
concrete but is normally a reinforced box structure. As an ES, this type of building 
behaves similarly to an earth-covered building with the additional advantage of 
having been specifically designed to resist the blast loading and therefore giving 
stored explosives complete protection from initiation at reduced IMD.
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Figure 12 shows an example of an earth-covered igloo type ESH. Igloo ESHs represent 
a considerable investment in physical infrastructure but they are the safest and 
most cost-effective type of ammunition store where constraints on available real 
estate exist.
Figure 12 – Earth-covered magazine “igloo” type Explosives Storehouse 136)
In order for ammunition stocks to be inspected and repaired, appropriate processing 
facilities are required. It is recognized that many States do not have the resources 
to develop new ammunition storage and processing facilities from scratch. Where 
existing facilities are to be adapted or enhanced, then priority should be given to 
those aspects which affect safety and security. It is essential that only specific 
equipment authorized for use within explosive facilities is used within ESHs and 
APBs. Any item which is capable of acting as a source of ignition should only be 
introduced after careful consideration. The safety standard for electrical installations 
is particularly important and specific technical requirements are covered in the 
IATG 05.40. 137)
 What is an Ammunition Process Building (APB) ?  
The IATG define an APB as a building or area that contains or is intended to 
contain one or more of the following activities : maintenance, preparation, 
inspection, breakdown, renovation, test or repair of ammunition and 
explosives. 138)  This includes facilities such as missile test rooms, 
preparation buildings, explosives workshops and all facilities used for 
ammunition maintenance and preparation. APBs may be considered as 
both Potential Exposion Sites and Exposed Sites, for the purposes of 
explosive quantity distance assessments and are normally surrounded by 
barricades to reduce the hazard.
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4.5  OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF AMMUNITION STORAGE
Potential hazardous effects are inherent with ammunition and explosives (and their 
constituent energetic components), within the facilities that contain them or process 
them, as well as within every ammunition-related activity and process.
 Depending on the material and activity or process involved, inadvertent 
initiation or functioning of ammunition, explosives, or one of their energetic 
components could result, due to any number of stimuli or threats, such as 
incorrect handling, drop, impact, friction, spark, heat, cold, electrostatic 
discharge, radio frequency-induced currents, incompatibility between 
materials or substances, or due to chemical instability e.g. propellant 
stabilizer depletion.
The inadvertent initiation of even small quantities of explosives can lead to death or 
serious injury and may lead to a major catastrophe. 139) Consequently, awareness, 
understanding and constant management and control of ammunition and explosives- 
related risk should always be foremost in the minds of those who manage and 
work with ammunition and explosives. 140)
Because of the very broad range of topics associated with the operational aspects 
of ammunition storage, this subsection focuses primarily on basic organizational 
and programmatic elements that should be implemented to help assure the safety 
of ammunition-related process and activities associated with ammunition storage. 
This subsection explains why these operational aspects are important and what they 
entail. It will then discuss further some of the guidance and requirements given in the 
IATG for addressing specific operational aspects associated with storage operations.
 Though the focus of this section is on ammunition storage, it’s important to 
be aware that most of the programmatic elements discussed  
herein are very much applicable across the full range of explosives and 
ammunition-related activities and operations.
What do operational aspects entail ?
The IATG do not provide a definition of “operational” as it pertains to ammunition 
storage, nor do they describe what operational aspects of ammunition storage are 
entailed. However, it does dedicate IATG module 06 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) 
(Operations)] – to this particular topic. 141) The collective focus of the series is on :
• Awareness of risks and hazards associated with ammunition and explosives (not 
only inherent with ammunition and explosives, but also posed by external threats) ;
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• The need for management, controls, and oversight of ammunition and explosives, 
as well as associated components (facilities, equipment, processes, personnel, 
etc.) and operational-related activities performed on ammunition and explosives, 
or to one of these components (such as maintenance and repairs to facilities and 
equipment) ; and
• Providing guidance and programmatic element requirements (with reference 
given to other applicable IATG modules as necessary) related to the above for :
• IATG 06.10 : Control of explosives facilities.
• IATG 06.20 : Storage space requirements.
• IATG 06.30 : Storage and handling.
• IATG 06.40 : Ammunition packaging and marking.
• IATG 06.50 : Specific safety precautions (storage and operations).
• IATG 06.60 : Works services (construction and repair).
• IATG 06.70 : Inspection of explosives facilities.
• IATG 06.80 : Inspection of ammunition.
 The titles of IATG 06.10 to 06.80 make it apparent that all aspects of facilities 
and operations associated with ammunition and explosives should be 
assessed, managed and monitored, in order to address risks associated 
with ammunition and explosives and related activities.
Why are operational aspects of ammunition storage important ?
The national ammunition stockpile and associated infrastructure, equipment and 
personnel represent a significant financial and strategic investment for a State. 
Consequently, constant vigilance and careful consideration of the operational 
aspects of ammunition and explosives are necessary for the safety, security and 
functionality of the national stockpile and the mitigation of risk relating to diversion 
and unplanned explosion events. These risks call for the management of ammunition 
and all related activities. This should be considered as essential, and not doing so 
significantly increases the likelihood of an unplanned explosion event or of having 
a stockpile that cannot support national requirements.
What does an effective operational structure look like ?
The titles of the eight modules listed above give a clue as to what subject areas 
the IATG associate with an effective ammunition storage operational structure. 
However, a crucial first step is necessary before these subject areas can be ad-
dressed properly - the development of a national organizational structure that has 
the responsibility to manage, monitor, control, maintain and provide oversight of 
ammunition and explosives, the facilities that house and process them, and all 
other related processes and activities.
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 To help accomplish effective and comprehensive operational storage and 
manage the “operational aspects” associated with such storage, an 
organizational structure needs to be developed with well-defined roles and 
responsibilities.
The IATG advise on the establishment of an ammunition stockpile management 
system with a clear chain of command and responsibilities. The organizational structure 
for national stockpile management proposed in the IATG consists of an ammunition 
storage unit, a technical inspection unit, a training unit and an ammunition inspectorate. 
IATG 03.10 gives an example of a management structure as in Table 4, found in 
section 4.2. The operational structure entails the following :  142)
• Ammunition stockpile management department. The role of this national-level 
organization with a defined safety-oriented programme (preferably designated by 
national policy) would be to identify major programmatic roles and responsibilities 
and provide over-arching governing directives for assessing and managing risks 
associated with ammunition and explosives and related activities.
• Stockpile management organization. The stockpile management organization 
would be the intermediate-level organization, subordinate to the ammunition 
stockpile management department. It would have a number of management 
system sub-organizations subordinate to it, and its primary role would be to provide 
direct management and oversight of all ammunition and explosives-related work 
activities. It would have the following broad responsibilities :
• Incorporate governing directives issued by the ammunition stockpile management 
department into guidance documents, standards, processes and operating 
procedures for use at all intermediate and user levels ;
• Develop necessary training courses and provide training for staff ;
• Manage and assure the availability of appropriate facilities, tools, equipment 
and other requirements as necessary ; and
• Conduct the required testing to ensure the safety and functionality of stockpile 
ammunition.
 The stockpile management organization has a critical role in the success of 
and proper implementation of national policy and directives and with this 
comes considerable responsibility. IATG 03.10 provides a list of specific 
responsibilities that should be assigned to the stockpile management 
organization. 143)
Programmatic elements
Now that an organizational structure has been identified, the programmatic elements 
that should be established and managed by this organizational structure can be 
addressed. These elements are defined within the eight IATG modules listed on 
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previous page and will help manage risk associated with ammunition-related pro-
cesses and activities. The purpose and programmatic elements addressed within 
each module are summarized below.
• Control of explosives facilities (IATG 06.10). Explosives facilities, by their very 
nature, present special hazards and these hazards must be uppermost in the 
minds of those responsible for their administration and who work in them. This 
module outlines the control regime that should be implemented and managed 
for explosives facilities. Table 6 lists the main areas of consideration addressed 
by IATG 06.10 and associated with this control regime.
Table 6 – Controls pertaining to explosives facilities as described in IATG 06.10
Theme IATG 06.10 
Paragraph
Relevant controls
Personnel employed in 
explosives facilities
4 • Training and supervision
• Special conditions of employment
• Specific employment conditions
Security 5 • Patrolling and guarding
• Control of entry
• Contraband
• Searching of personnel
• Magnetic therapy products
• Spark, flame or heat- producing items
• Lighting of fires
• Vehicle tracker items
• Other controlled items
Estate management 6 • Site plans
• Works services
• Surplus facilities
• Roads and drainage
• Railway lines
• Vermin control
• Vegetation and crops
• Control of trees and shrubs
• Cut vegetation
• Agriculture and agricultural chemicals
• Livestock
Fire and first aid 7 • First aid equipment
• Firefighting equipment
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Aircraft overflight 8 • Helicopters
Potential Explosion Site 
(PES)
9 • Cleanliness
• Action on vacating a PES
• Emergency evacuation
• Thunderstorms
• Tools, materials, and equipment permitted 
in a PES
Operations in a PES 10 • Explosive storehouse and open bay storage
• Ready-to-use ammunition
• Captured enemy ammunition and foreign 
explosives
• Process buildings
• Receipt and issue bays
• Handling and testing of electro-explosive 
devices
Storage 11 • Covered storage
• Open storage
• Explosive items
• Non-explosive items
• Dangerous goods and explosive stores filled 
with dangerous goods
• Ammunition and ammunition packaging
• Commercial explosives and fireworks
• Experimental explosives
• Special stores
• Isolation and segregation of stocks
• Rail and vehicle and staging facilities
• Storage conditions
• Ventilation and relative humidity
Issuing of ammunition 12 • Stock turnover
• Prevention of deterioration of explosives
Underground storage 
(tunnels)
13 • General
• Stacking
• Repair and maintenance
• Records
• Prohibited storage
• Limitations in storage
• Mechanical handling equipment
• Humidity
• Non-explosive dangerous goods
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• Storage space requirements (IATG 06.20). Storage of ammunition and explosives 
is expensive and must be efficient to be cost effective. However, efficient storage 
requires effective storage space vplanning, and that is the primary focus area of 
this module, which provides guidance on the general practical considerations (and 
recommended spacing) for storage space planning. Figure 13 gives an example 
from IATG 06.20 of a methodology 144) that can be used for determining the 
theoretical maximum unit of space (UOS) available for storage within an ESH :
Figure 13 – Example methodology for theoretical UOS maximum
ESH DETAILS FIGURES COMMENT 
ESH width 6m   
ESH length 8m   
ESH height 3.7m   
ESH volume 177.6m3   
      
Height of dunnage 0.1m From the oor 
MHE gangway 2m Up the middle 
Gap from walls 0.5m From each face 
Gap from ceiling 0.5m From top package 
      
Available ESH width 3m 6-(2x0.5)-2  
Available ESH length 7m 7-(2x0.5) 
Available ESH height 3m 3.7-0.1-0.5. Rounded down to 
nearest meter/pallet 
Maximum theoretical UOS 63 UOS 3x7x3 
• Storage and handling (IATG 06.30). The safe storage and handling of ammunition 
and explosives is a basic requirement of explosives safety. Improper storage and 
handling can result in an unplanned explosion event that can lead to loss of stocks 
and facilities and cause deaths and injuries. Even if an explosion event does not 
occur, damaged ammunition has to be either repaired or destroyed and then 
replaced at potentially considerable expense. Both scenarios are unacceptable, 
and this module provides guidance on general, practical considerations for safe 
storage and handling of ammunition and explosives. Table 7 lists the main safe 
storage and handling aspects and areas of consideration addressed by IATG 06.30.
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Table 7 – Safe storage and handling considerations as described in IATG 06.30
Theme IATG 06.30 
Paragraph
Relevant controls
Handling of ammunition 4 • Safety
• Classification of ammunition
• Approval to store
• Physical handling of ammunition
• Damaged packaging
Stacking of ammunition 5 • General criteria
• Loose packaged ammunition
• Unpackaged ammunition
• Specific stacking requirements
Use of racking 6 • General criteria
• White phosphorus ammunition
Stack tally cards and 
pallet contents sheets
7 • Location of tally cards
• Required information
• Accuracy
Use of lifting equipment 
and slings
8 • Ferrous slings
• Multi-legged slings
• Slinging of loads
Storage temperature 9 • Temperature restrictions
• Temperature recording
• Ammunition packaging and marking (IATG 06.40). Ammunition and explosives 
should be placed in packaging that is designed to protect the contents from all 
foreseeable hazards regarding physical damage and environmental deterioration, 
throughout the expected life of the item, up to and including final disposal of the item. 
The packaging should be marked to provide information to enable the explosives 
to be stored, handled and transported correctly. The UN Model Regulations (see 
section 4.7) provide internationally accepted best practices for packaging and 
marking of dangerous goods (including ammunition and explosives). The general 
practical ammunition packaging and marking information given in IATG 06.40 
is based on the UN Model Regulations. 145) Table 8 lists the main packaging and 
marking aspects and areas of consideration addressed by IATG 06.40.
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Table 8 – Packaging and handling areas of consideration as described in IATG 06.40
Theme IATG 06.40 
Paragraph
Relevant controls
Ammunition packaging 4 • Packaging requirements
• Design and safety of explosives packaging
• Change of Hazard Division
• Physical handling of ammunition packages
• Temporary packaging
• Special packaging
• Marking of ammunition and its associated 
packaging
• Colour coding of ammunition and its 
associated packaging
• Fraction packages
• Empty ammunition packaging
Palletization 5 • Reasons for palletization
• Palletization system requirements
• Ammunition palletization restrictions
• Damaged pallets/banding material
• Identification of palletized ammunition
• Movement of palletized ammunition
Sealing of ammunition 
packaging
6 • Types of ammunition seals
• Authenticity sealing
• Technical staff sealing
• Broken seals
• Qualification and authorization to carry 
out authenticity sealing
• Sealing procedures and authorized tools
• Packing notes
Ammunition in transit 7 • Staging posts
• Inspection requirements
• Specific safety precautions (storage and operations) (IATG 06.50). The most 
obvious hazard from explosives during storage is an accidental explosion or 
deflagration. 146) This module highlights specific areas of special risk (including 
health hazards) associated with certain chemicals and materials used in the 
manufacture of ammunition as well as certain ammunition itself and describes 
mitigating factors. It also highlights other specific areas of management concern, 
such as :
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• Certifying packages, articles, equipment, buildings and land, as free from 
explosives.
• Explosive ordnance disposal, range clearance and demilitarization.
• Use of munitions in museums or displays or as souvenirs.
• Emergency planning and arrangements.
• Assuring explosives are “safe-to-move”/certificate of safety.
• Storage temperature/humidity monitoring and management.
• Work services (construction and repair) (IATG 06.60). Personnel involved in 
construction and repair activities within an explosives facility or area should be 
tightly controlled for their own safety and the safety of others. Adequate risk 
control measures and procedures should be put in place in order to identify and 
minimize any risk from their activities and to them from surrounding activities. 
This module provides guidance on control measures and procedures for the control 
of personnel involved in the construction, repair and maintenance of explosives 
facilities. 147)  Table 9 lists the main work services aspects and areas of consideration 
addressed by IATG 06.60.
Table 9 – Work service areas of consideration as described in IATG 06.60
Theme IATG 06.60 
Paragraph
Relevant controls
Specific responsibilities 4 • Contractor
• Explosives area support workers
• Head of the establishment and post holder 
duties
• Site plan
• Explosives licence
• Safety briefing and permits work
• Other duties
• Role of the safety monitor
Major works 5 • Risk assessment
• Outside the IBD
• Between the IBD and the PTRD
• Within the PTRD
Minor works 6 • One-off tasks
• Staff numbers and length of task
Additional safety 
requirements
7 • Working on or in a PES
• Working in an explosive storage area
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• Inspection of explosives facilities (IATG 06.70). Inspections of explosives 
facilities are conducted to assess if explosive safety requirements pertaining to 
each facility, its support equipment, and its operations are being followed and 
are consistent with national regulations and issued licences. Deterioration of 
an explosives facility or support equipment, violations of licence limitations and 
conditions, or failure to follow requirements can all potentially create a hazard for 
personnel and property. It is imperative that all aspects of the explosives licence 
and the national authority explosives regulatory regime are being complied with 
and that explosives facilities are fit for purpose. 148)
There are two types of inspection carried out on explosives facilities : 149)
• Internal – using staff from the explosives facility. Informal internal inspections 
should be carried out as a routine daily task by all staff working in the explosives 
facility. Additionally, a formal internal inspection should be carried out by the person 
in charge of the explosives facility (or a nominated and qualified representative).
• External – using staff from other facilities or as required by the national technical 
authority. External inspections should be carried out by competent bodies 
appointed by the national technical authority. The aim of these inspections 
is to ensure continued safe storage, processing and use of explosives, in 
compliance with national technical authority explosives, health, safety and 
environmental legislation.
 The national technical authority should have requirements for documents, 
procedures and checklists established for the carrying out of inspections. 
The national authority should also set a required inspection frequency. It is 
generally accepted that for internal inspections once a month is sufficient, 
coupled with some non-routine inspections. For external inspections, 
frequency will quite often be annual, but should be influenced by staffing 
and operational tempo. 
Inspections should be carried out by qualified personnel using checklists, with the 
results of inspections recorded on an inspection record sheet and in a log book 
established for each PES. Figure 14 gives an example PES log book extracted from 
Annex C of IATG 06.70. 150) It includes a checklist of inspection points for the PES 
and can be used to record the status of checks and tests conducted.
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Figure 14 – Extract from sample PES Log Book
PES Log Book (Record of Checks and Tests) IATG Form 06.70A 
Items 1 to 18 & 21 to 25 insert √  if correct or X if incorrect.  
Items 19 to 20 insert √ when carried out. 
Year:             PES:  
J F M A M J J A S O N D 
1 State of repair             
2 Cleanliness             
3 Dampness             
4 Windows             
5 Drains, gutters etc             
6 Heating/ventilation/air conditioning             
7 Condition of traverses             
8 Locks, key labelling             
9 Explosives stored (ELL and CG)             
10 Marking/sealing of packaging             
11 Fire appliances and check dates             
12 Fire symbols             
13 Vegetation control             
14 ELL displayed and safety posters             
15 Lifting equipment check and certification             
16 Electrical installations             
17 Lightning protection systems             
18 Conducting/ant-static floor and HAPTM9             
19 Fire practice             
20 Evacuation drill             
21 Incident/accident reporting              
22 Designated smoking area             
23 Empty box areas             
24 Outstanding defects             
25 Documentation             
26 Additional –separate report             
Initials:             
Date:             
Head of Establishment Signature 
(3 Monthly Check).  
    
Date:     
Additionally, IATG 06.70 provides detailed information about what to inspect, how 
to docu ent inspections, grading of inspection results, and actions to take where 
inspections detect deficiencies and violations of licences. The appendices provide 
a sample PES log book, national authority inspection guidelines, and a sample 
explo ive storehouse (ESH) inspection checklist. Figure 15 provides an extract of 
the ESH inspection checklist. 151)
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Figure 15 – Extract from sample ESH Inspection Checklist 152)
INSPECTION AREA SPECIFIC IATG REFERENCE REMARKS ACCEPTABLE / REQUIRES WORK
Health and Safety at Work Policy Statements National Responsibility
Organisation and Responsibilities National Responsibility
Health and Safety Audits National Responsibility
Health and Safety Training National Responsibility
COSHH21 Assessments National Responsibility
Risk Assessments
IATG 02.10, Clause 7 and
IATG 06.10, Clause 6.7.2
Explosives Limit Licensing Explosive Licences IATG 02.30, Clauses 7 and 8
Safety Distances
IATG 02.20, Annexes and
IATG 06.10, Clause 6.1
Safeguarding of Distances
IATG 02.40, Clause 4 and
IATG 06.10, Clause 6.1
Directional Weapons Map IATG 02.40
PES Logbooks / Record Cards IATG 06.70, Clause 5.1.1
Signing IATG 06.70, Annex C
Publications IATG 01.10, Annex D
Security
Intruder Detection Systems
IATG 06.70, Clause 5.1.3 and
IATG 09.10, Clause 8.6.4
Control of Entry
IATG 06.10, Clause 5.2 and
IATG 09.10, Clause 8.5
Control of Keys IATG 09.10, Clause 8.5.1
Exclusion of Prohibited Articles? IATG 06.10, Clause 5.3
Security Fences IATG 09.10, Clause 8.7.1
• Inspection of ammunition (IATG 06.80). Inspection of ammunition may be 
required for the following ;
• Where ammunition has been damaged ;
• Where faults and defects in the ammunition type are suspected ;
• As part of a routine inspection or surveillance programme ; and
• As a “safe to move” inspection.
 IATG 06.80 should be consulted in parallel with IATG 07.20 - Surveillance 
and in-service proof, which provides more useful information on the 
rationale for a surveillance regime and the impact of climatic and 
environmental conditions on ammunition shelf life. 153)
Recommended procedures for inspection of generic types of ammunition are 
provided in IATG 06.80. Table 10 summarizes the main ammunition inspection 
aspects and areas of consideration addressed by IATG 06.80, which also provides 
a number of annexes devoted to inspection points for generic weapon types, such 
as burning fuses, 154) demolition charges, 155) mines, 156) mortar bombs, 157) and small 
arms ammunition. 158)
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Table 10 – Ammunition inspection areas of consideration as described in IATG 06.80
Theme IATG 06.80 
Paragraph
Relevant controls
Types of inspections 4 • General criteria
Safety during processing 5 • Risk assessments
• Visual inspection
• Documentation
Condition classification 
of ammunition
6 • Ammunition classification
• Ammunition condition groups and codes
Markings 7 • General criteria
Seals 8 • General criteria
Common inspection 
points
9 • Lot/batch numbers
• Rust identification
• Fuze covers
• Fuze plugs
• Gauging
• Luting
• Torque
Specific to type 
inspection points
10 • General criteria
• Generic ammunition types inspection points 
and associated annexes
“Safe to move” 
inspections
11 • General criteria
• STM inspection / certification
• STM – post explosion hazards
Documentation 12 • Documentation system
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4.6 AMMUNITION PROCESSING
Ammunition processing is a term which covers all tasks involving the repair, testing, 
modification, disassembly or breakdown of ammunition and explosives. 159) Any 
such task carries with it an increased risk of accidental initiation. It is therefore 
regarded as explosives processing and should be carried out in a facility suitable for 
the explosives process activity, and normally in isolation from the storage of bulk stocks 
of explosives. IATG 07.10 covers ammunition processing, 160) while IATG 07.20 
pertains to ammunition surveillance. 161) This section provides an overview of these 
modules and related measures.
What is ammunition processing ?
 What is ammunition processing ?  
Ammunition processing refers to the activities undertaken in a process 
facility that involves building, repair, refurbishment, breakdown, test and 
inspection of explosives articles and their components. 162)
Ammunition processing has to be conducted safely and effectively, requiring careful 
planning and management of risk. The IATG identify the following elements which 
are critical to the establishment of a safe system of work to undertake ammunition 
processing : 163)
• Trained and competent staff.
• Appropriate levels of supervision and management.
• Written instructions for ammunition processing.
• Appropriate equipment.
• Appropriate facilities.
A risk evaluation should be conducted as part of the planning process for all ammunition 
processing activities. This subject is covered in detail in IATG 02.10. Risk analysis 
is the systematic use of information to identify hazards and estimate risk. Risk 
evaluation determines whether a tolerable risk has been achieved for the ammunition 
processing task being analyzed.
Hazard identification is extremely important as ammunition processing may create 
hazards not associated with any other ammunition life-cycle activity. Careful 
consideration should be given to the hazards associated with the breakdown of 
ammunition and also the exposure of energetic fillings which create an enhanced 
accidental explosion risk.
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 Prevention is better than cure and all efforts should be taken to avoid an 
accident. Should an accident occur, then the immediate priority is to make 
the scene safe in order for first aid to be provided to any injured personnel. It 
is essential that all processing operations are stopped and actions taken to 
secure any ammunition which may be present. If the accident involves a fire 
then site-wide contingency plans should be enacted. 164)
Unsafe ammunition may be encountered during the course of ammunition 
processing and the procedures to be adopted in this event should be 
defined in the munitions repair instructions. It may be necessary for the 
item to be moved to a disposal site where appropriate action using 
explosive ordnance disposal procedures may take place. 165)
Thunderstorms are prevalent in tropical and other hot climatic zones and pose 
a particular hazard to munitions containing electro-explosive devices (EEDs). It 
is essential that ammunition processing is not conducted on munitions 
containing EEDs when a thunderstorm is in the vicinity. It is strongly 
recommended that all ammunition processing and movement ceases at 
facilities during thunderstorms. 166)
How is ammunition processing conducted ?
The most effective way of reducing the maximum credible event which could occur 
in an accident scenario during ammunition processing is by limiting the explosive 
content of the ammunition permitted in the Ammunition Process Building (APB) at 
one time. 167) In judging the explosive limit for a particular task, due attention must be 
paid to the maximum explosive quantity specified in the Explosives Limit Licence 168) 
as well as the quantity of ammunition required for process efficiency. Care should 
be taken to ensure that high levels of stocks do not accumulate during ammunition 
processing operations. Other measures can be implemented to limit the risk of 
accidents during ammunition processing, including the following :
• There should be a limit to the number of individuals 169) within an ammunition 
processing facility as a condition of the explosives licence, or a limit to the number 
of individuals responsible for carrying out specific ammunition processing tasks.
• Only personnel that have received appropriate training and are adequately 
supervised should be used in the processing of ammunition. 170) 
• Ammunition processing should never take place in ammunition storage facilities. 
Ideally, processing should be conducted in purpose-built and licensed APBs. Where 
APBs are not available, effective use may be made of transportable or temporary 
ammunition processing facilities. 171)
• The use of correct equipment for ammunition processing, to be considered during 
the risk evaluation and planning process. 172) 
• All electrical equipment must be tested and confirmed suitable for use with explosives. 173)
• Staff must be positively encouraged to use the right tool for the job and to ensure 
that the tool is used in the correct fashion. To limit the potential for improvisation, 
only the specific tools required to carry out the task in hand are to be present.
04
 —
 I
AT
G
 m
od
ul
es
 s
um
m
ar
y 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
| 86
Figure 16 shows illustrations of a simple inpection process being undertaken.
Figure 16 – Ammunition inspection process 174)
Relatively few countries have specific facilities to safely process ammunition and it 
may be necessary to implement temporary measures for the on-site processing and 
inspection of ammunition. These facilities may take the form of temporary shelters ; 
however, all safety requirements shall be implemented. Such facilities will need to 
be provided with barricades and be located at safe separation distances from other 
sites storing or processing ammunition, and also from other inhabited buildings.
Examples of ammunition processing
There are various types of ammunition processing. This section provides an overview 
of the different ammunition processing types.
(a) Inspection of ammunition : Inspection of ammunition is one of the most straight-
forward ammunition processing tasks and typically may involve the following :
• Confirmation of the physical condition and quantity of ammunition within an 
ammunition package and confirmation that the items are stored in approved 
service packaging ;
• A visual examination to confirm whether ammunition which has been issued for 
training or operations and where the package has been opened is still fit for use ;
• Visual detection of signs of corrosion or other deterioration which may indicate 
the requirement of future ammunition repair tasks ;
• The use of diagnostic equipment, such as gauges, to confirm the serviceability 
of items.
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(b) Break down of ammunition : It may be necessary to break down ammunition 
items as part of a broader demilitarization task, or to provide samples for ammunition 
surveillance and testing. 175) The breaking down of ammunition is inherently more 
hazardous than ammunition inspection, as explosive fillings are often exposed during 
the process. There may also be particular hazards associated with the removal of 
items such as fixed fuzes which require the use of remotely operated equipment.
(c) Ammunition repair : Ammunition repair includes all activities necessary to 
return an ammunition item to a serviceable condition. It may include, for example, 
the replacement of desiccants in ammunition packaging, the removal of corrosion 
and the repainting of shells and aircraft bombs. At the more complex end of the 
spectrum, it may involve the removal and replacement of individual components 
within ammunition items such as fuzes, igniters and propelling charges. Ammunition 
repair tasks may originate as a result of a planned activity, such as a life extension 
programme, or may originate as a result of information gathered during in-service 
surveillance or proof of ammunition.
(d) Ammunition packaging : Ammunition packaging forms an important part of 
an effective ammunition safety management system. 176) It is recommended that 
States classify ammunition in accordance with United Nations guidelines and best 
international practice. 177) It is suggested that all ammunition packages be marked 
with the following information :
• Hazard Classification Code, i.e. the combination of Hazard Division and Compatibility 
Group ;
• Nature or designation of ammunition item ;
• Quantity contained within the package ; and
• UN serial number and proper shipping name.
The condition of ammunition packaging has an important role to play in maintaining 
the safety and integrity of the ammunition type. To ease handling, boxes should 
ideally be palletized and not stacked to more than a safely designated height.
(e) Ammunition surveillance : The primary purpose of ammunition surveillance is 
to ensure that the ammunition type meets defined quality standards. 178) It involves 
the systematic method of evaluating the properties, characteristics and performance 
capabilities of the ammunition type throughout its life cycle (manufacturer to 
disposal) in order to assess the reliability, safety and operational effectiveness of 
in-service stocks and to provide data to support decisions on disposal or shelf-life 
extension. A related activity to ammunition surveillance is proof, 179) which includes 
the functional testing or firing of the ammunition.
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For most munitions, the following degradation mechanisms will impact on the 
technical condition of the munition : 180)
• For energetic materials :
• Stabilizer depletion within propellants containing nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine
• De-bonding between energetic materials and inert surfaces
• Chemical migration within energetic materials
• Cracking of brittle materials or other mechanical defects brought about by 
daily temperature fluctuations
• For electronic components :
• Component ageing and deterioration
• Component shock damage through poor handling
• Structural integrity :
• Mechanical and vibration damage
• Corrosion
• Deterioration of seals, O-rings and gaskets
 It is important to note that from the moment an ammunition item is 
manufactured it begins to degrade. Ammunition surveillance may detect 
the deterioration of a particular component in an ammunition item and 
ammunition repair may address that particular issue. Careful storage, 
transport and handling may cause the rate of degradation to reduce, but all 
ammunition will eventually reach the end of its safe shelf life and require 
disposal.
(f) Assessing propellant stability : One of the most significant factors determining 
the safety of a State’s ammunition stockpile is the chemical stability of the propellants 
found in tank, artillery and mortar-propelling cartridges, as well as the propellant 
grains in large solid rocket motors. These items are most often manufactured with 
a mixture of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine and contain stabilizers to remove the 
chemical products of decomposition. Over time, particularly when munitions are 
stored at elevated temperatures, these stabilizers become depleted. The rate of 
chemical deterioration of a propellant is approximately doubled for every 10° C rise 
in temperature above 30° C. Over time the stabilizer is depleted and in the absence 
of this stabilizer, the rate at which the propellant decomposes accelerates until it 
spontaneously ignites. Prolonged storage at elevated temperatures has a definite 
detrimental effect on propellant shelf life. 181)
04
 —
 I
AT
G
 m
od
ul
es
 s
um
m
ar
y 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
89 |
Figure 17 shows an ammunition technician from the Canadian Army conducting a 
propellant stabilizer test using high performance liquid chromatography equipment.
Figure 17 –  Ammunition technician conducting propellant stabilizer  
assessment on ammunition 182)
 (g) Ammunition in-service proof : In-service proof is an activity which is undertaken 
during the in-service phase of the ammunition life cycle. The purpose of in-service 
proof is to ensure that the ammunition item meets the required operational quality 
levels and is safe and suitable for continued service use. 183) Ammunition in-service 
proof fulfils the following objectives :
• It ensures that the ammunition remains safe and suitable for use and has not 
deteriorated in storage ;
• It provides a quantitative means of ensuring that the ammunition remains fit for 
operational use ;
• It allows future performance to be predicted and decisions taken on service life and 
any operational or training constraints which may be applied to the ammunition.
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In-service proof of ammunition may be conducted in either a quantitative or 
qualitative fashion. For quantitative assessment the ammunition must be fired 
under strictly controlled conditions and appropriate data such as muzzle velocity, 
chamber pressure, range and target effect, need to be collected. This quantitative 
data should then be compared to manufacturers’ baseline technical performance 
data, or other data collected during the munition’s qualification testing prior to 
entry into service to determine whether performance is satisfactory. Qualitative 
data may be collected through monitoring or ammunition fired during training. 
Appropriate observations by ammunition technical personnel may provide a reliable 
early indication of problems which are developing in the ammunition stockpile 
through degradation and deterioration.
4.7  TRANSPORT OF AMMUNITION
The transport of ammunition and explosives is an essential life-cycle related activity 
associated with a State’s national stockpile and is explained in IATG 08.10. It is an 
important step towards meeting operational and strategic objectives. If a State 
owns ammunition, then it will need to be transported at some point. However, 
ammunition presents an inherent risk wherever it is located and even more so 
during transport, where it could be exposed to hazards, such as a fuel oil fire due 
to a transport-related accident, or external threats, such as a bullet attack, which 
can impact its safety and security.
These risks point to the need for the transport of dangerous goods (which includes 
ammunition and explosives) to be regulated in order to prevent, as far as possible, 
accidents to persons or property, and damage to the environment, the means of 
transport employed or to other goods. 184)
This section describes what ammunition transport is, what it involves, why it is 
important, as well as the international system for dangerous goods transportation. 
Information is also provided to describe what an effective national transport system 
might look like in terms of how a State can minimize risk for safe and secure 
transport of its ammunition.
What is transport of ammunition ?
Ammunition is specifically developed, procured, manufactured, stored, maintained 
and disposed of in support of national operational and strategic objectives, which 
means that during its life cycle it will need to be moved and transported for any 
number of purposes, as listed in Table 11. This transport could be in a variety of different 
transport modes, such as truck, railcar, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, ship, or 
barge and could be domestic or international.
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Table 11 – Purposes for ammunition transport
Import (new or used) Export (new, used, donation)
• Manufacturer to depot (new production) • Trials and experiments
• Ammunition maintenance or upgrade • Disposal/demilitarization
• Hazard classification testing • Surveillance/propellant stability
• Proof testing
• Relocation – depot to unit (training and 
operations)
• Research • Safety testing
A significant transportation consideration for any state is the multitude of different 
regulations (national, regional, international) that could apply to its ammunition 
transport needs. For domestic movements, these operations need to be conducted 
safely. For international movements, these operations must also be conducted safely, 
but they also need to comply with other States’ requirements and international 
agreements. With different regulations in every country and applying to different 
modes of transport, the international movement of ammunition and explosives would 
be seriously impeded, if not made impossible and unsafe, without international 
agreements. 185)
Additionally, as ammunition and explosives can also be subject to other kinds of 
constraints (i.e. safe storage requirements and environment protection factors), con-
sistent agreements for their safe transport within and between States are essential. 186)
The foundation of international dangerous goods transportation regulations is the 
United Nations (UN) hazard classification system contained in IATG 01.50, which 
does not take into account the probability of an incident, but assumes that if it can 
happen it will, and when it does, it identifies the extent of the hazard. This system 
(discussed further in next section) consists of the following : 187)
• Nine dangerous goods classes, of which class 1 comprises explosives ;
• Class 1 is then divided into Hazard Divisions, which indicate the type of hazard to 
be expected, primarily in the event of an accident involving a quantity of ammunition. 
The Hazard Division will be assigned, based on the items’ behaviour and test 
results, according to the Manual of Tests and Criteria of the UN Recommendations 
on the Transport of Dangerous Goods ; 188)
• Class 1 ammunition is further divided into Compatibility Groups designed to 
minimize the risk of storing items together that will either increase the risk of an 
accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident ;
• The UN Hazard Classification Code (HCC) for an explosive or type of ammunition 
is the combination of the Hazard Division and the Compatibility Group.
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 What is a Hazard Classification Code (HCC) ?  
The HCC is an alphanumeric symbol that denotes the complete HCC for a 
particular type of ammunition. The code consists of two or three digits 
indicating the Hazard Division followed by a letter corresponding to the 
Compatibility Group, e.g. 1.3G. 189)
 What is the Hazard Division (HD) ?  
The UN classification system that identifies hazardous substances. 190)
 What is a Compatibility Group (CG) ?  
A grouping identified by a letter which, when referenced to a compatibility 
table, shows those explosives which may be stored or transported together 
without significantly increasing the probability of an accident or, for a given 
quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident. Codes are used to 
indicate which types of ammunition may be safely stored together. 191)
Why is transport of ammunition important ?
Transport safety is approached differently to ammunition storage. The storage 
requirements given in the IATG focus on mitigating the consequences of an 
explosion event by ensuring that the ammunition stockpile is kept away from the 
general population and public infrastructure. Ammunition transport, however, brings 
ammunition in close proximity to the public, major infrastructure and potentially 
many other exposures, such as ports and other transport distribution networks, 
cities and other explosives locations. Consequently, it is important to effectively 
assess, manage and regulate the transport of ammunition in order to prevent 
accidents, as far as possible. 192)
To address these aspects, the United Nations has developed mechanisms for the 
harmonization of hazard classification criteria during transport and safe transport 
conditions. These are accepted by other international agreements governing the 
transport of ammunition and explosives by road, rail, air or sea, and help ensure 
consistency between various regulatory systems. 193) States should adopt, support 
and follow, to the greatest extent possible, international agreements for domestic 
and international transport of ammunition and other dangerous goods.
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 Responsibility for the transport of dangerous goods issued within the 
United Nations system lies with the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) whose mandate includes the establishment of norms, standards 
and conventions to facilitate international cooperation on transportation 
within and outside the European region. 194) For more information on the 
UNECE, visit : www.unece.org/trans/welcome.html
Dangerous goods documents developed by the UNECE, which all other 
international dangerous goods regulations complement, include :
•  The Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of 
Chemicals (GHS) ; a single, globally harmonized system to address 
the classification of chemicals, labels, and safety data sheets during 
transportation ; this includes explosives for military and civil use ; 195)
•  UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (also 
called the UN Model Regulations), that aim to present a basic scheme 
of provisions that will allow uniform development of national and 
international regulations governing the various modes of transport ; 196) 
and
•  The UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, which is a UNECE-developed 
document, that stipulates the range of tests that should be used to 
determine the Hazard Division applicable to a certain type of ammunition. 197)
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Table 12 provides a listing of the primary international agreements and their applicability 
as they relate to the transport of dangerous goods (which includes ammunition and 
explosives) by road, rail, air, waterway, and sea :
Table 12 – International regulations governing the transport of dangerous goods 198)
International 
Agreements
Responsible Organization Applicability
Globally Harmonized 
System of 
Classification 
and Labelling of 
Chemicals (GHS)
UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) www.unece.org/
trans/danger/danger.html
• Classification of 
chemicals, labels and 
safety data sheets during 
transportation - includes 
explosives for military and 
civilian use
UN 
Recommendations 
on the Transport 
of Dangerous 
Goods (UN Model 
Regulations)
UN Economic and Social Council’s 
Committee of Experts on the 
Transport of Dangerous Goods
www.unece.org/trans/danger/
publi/unrec/
rev13/13nature_e.html
• Complementary to GHS
• Designed to be generic of 
transport mode
• Dangerous goods hazard 
classification and transport 
requirements
UN Manual of Tests 
and Criteria
UN Economic and Social Council’s 
Committee of Experts on the 
Transport of Dangerous Goods
www.unece.org/trans/danger/
publi/unrec/
rev13/13nature_e.html
• Complementary to UN 
Model Regulations
• Contains criteria, test 
methods and procedures 
for the hazard classification 
of dangerous goods
European Agreement 
Concerning the 
International 
Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by 
Road (ADR)
UNECE
www.unece.org/trans/danger/
danger.html
• Safe transport of 
dangerous goods by road
European Agreement 
concerning the 
International 
Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by 
Inland Waterways 
(ADN)
UNECE
www.unece.org/trans/danger/
danger.html
• Safe transport of 
dangerous goods by inland 
waterways
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International 
Agreements
Responsible Organization Applicability
International 
Ordinance on 
the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods by 
Rail (RID)
Intergovernmental Organisation for 
International Carriage by Rail (OTIF)
www.otif.org/en/
• Safe transport of 
dangerous goods by rail
Annex 18, The 
Safe Transport of 
Dangerous Goods by 
Air, to the Convention 
on International Civil 
Aviation
International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO)
www.icao.int/safety/
DangerousGoods/Pages/
annex-18.aspx
• Addresses broad principles 
governing the international 
transport of dangerous 
goods by air
International Civil 
Aviation Organization 
Technical 
Instructions (ICAO-TI) 
(DOC 9284)
International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO)
www.icao.int/safety/
DangerousGoods/Pages/technical-
instructions.aspx
• Amplifies basic provisions 
of Annex 18 ; contains 
detailed instructions 
necessary for the safe 
international transport of 
dangerous goods by air
International 
Air Transport 
Association 
Dangerous Goods
Regulations (IATA 
DGR)
International Air Transport 
Association (IATA)
www.iata.org/Pages/default.aspx
• Safe transport of 
dangerous goods by air
• Provides a “field manual” 
version of the ICAO 
Technical Instructions.
International 
Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS)
International Maritime Organization 
www.imo.org
• Safe transport of 
dangerous goods at sea
• Chapter VII covers carriage 
of dangerous goods
International 
Maritime Dangerous 
Goods Code (IMDG 
Code)
International Maritime Organization
www.imo.org
• Advice on classification, 
stowage, segregation, 
packing, labelling, 
terminology and 
emergency response action 
of dangerous goods related 
to sea transport
Table 12 – Continued
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What does effective transport of ammunition look like ?
Transport of ammunition is an integral activity associated with stockpile management. 199) 
International requirements and agreements for the classification and transport of 
ammunition, all having the purpose of mitigating risk and increasing safety during the 
transportation of ammunition and explosives, have been identified and discussed in 
this section. IATG 08.10 state that ammunition and explosives should be transported 
in accordance with these international requirements and agreements, specifically :
• The requirements of the UN Model Regulations, which contain details of the symbols 
and hazard classifications required for the safe transport of ammunition and 
explosives ; 200) and,
• International regulations and agreements (see Table 12) that govern the transport of 
dangerous goods and state that ammunition and explosives should be transported 
in accordance with the requirements of these international regulations. 201)
The UN Model Regulations have been integrated into all international modal trans-
port regulations. Users, therefore, – including carriers, consignors and inspecting 
authorities of dangerous goods –benefit from simplified transport, handling and 
control and a reduction in time-consuming formalities. Whilst initially produced for 
the transport of dangerous goods, the principles have been applied by many States 
as the basis for a simplified consequential hazard and risk assessment for the 
storage of ammunition. 202) The combination of the Hazard Division and Compatibility 
Group results in a range of Hazard Classification Codes for all types of ammunition 
and explosives. These codes, or a similar national system, are critical to the safe 
storage and movement of ammunition and explosives. 203)
Consequently, the first steps for effective transport is the development of national 
policy and regulations that are based on the UN Model Regulations for the hazard 
classification of ammunition and explosives as discussed in this section, and that 
require the application of international transport regulations and agreements.
The next important step for effective transport is the development of an organizational 
structure, to include the assignment of a national competent authority, to serve as 
the technical authority that ensures compliance with national policy and regulations, 
the UN Model Regulations and international transport regulations and agreements. 
This organization and national competent authority should have the responsibility 
and oversight of the implementation of the adopted agreements and any related 
activities. IATG 03.10 suggests an ammunition stockpile management system 204) 
with its component organizations that would have the responsibility to manage, 
monitor, control, maintain and provide oversight of ammunition and explosives- 
related facilities, processes and other activities. Ammunition transport and its related 
activities are included as part of this system.
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 What is a competent authority ? 
 A competent authority is a body, organization, or otherwise-recognized 
entity as such, for any purpose in connection with (dangerous goods) 
regulations. 205)
The IATG do not specifically describe what effective ammunition transport should 
look like. However, throughout the IATG modules, transportation-related topics are 
addressed and integrated into stockpile management activities, while associated 
requirements and guidance are provided. Some examples include :
• Transportation classifications, labelling and marking ;  206)
• The impact of an ammunition fault or performance failure on transportation ;  207)
• The impact of bans and constraints on transportation ;  208) 
• Transportation aspects associated with ammunition management personnel 
competencies ;  209)
• Transportation-related operations as part of quantity and separation distance 
requirements ;  210)
• General ammunition packaging and marking information ;  211)
• Security during transport of ammunition. 212)
Consequently, adherence to IATG guidance already brings a State closer to an 
effective ammunition transport process.
 What is a ban ?  
The term “ban” refers to a moratorium placed on the issue and use of 
ammunition, usually pending technical investigation.  213)
What is a constraint ?  
The term “constraint” refers to the imposition of a limitation or restriction in 
the use, transportation, carriage, issue, storage or inspection of munitions.  214)
Ammunition transport has many distinct elements associated with it, and each 
plays an important role in ensuring ammunition is both safe to transport, as well 
as safe during transport. Some of these elements include ammunition design and 
associated operational testing as part of safety and suitability for service, hazard 
classification (including Compatibility Group) assignment and associated testing, 
packaging, marking and labelling, Compatibility Group mixing (for the transport mode 
involved), implementation of appropriate regulations and requirements, securing 
ammunition for transport, security of ammunition during transport, and documentation. 
A State should bear in mind that all these elements include transporting dangerous 
goods in one form or other. Through Life Management  215) approach to ammunition 
is particularly useful in order for a State to encompass and prepare for transports in all 
stages – from planning to procurement, to stockpile management and final disposal.
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4.8  SECURITY OF AMMUNITION STORAGE AREAS
The loss, theft, leakage and proliferation (collectively these are generally known as 
diversion) of stockpile ammunition can threaten a State’s ability to meet its national 
and strategic objectives. Additionally, ammunition diverted from national stockpiles 
can find its way into civil wars, insurgencies, terrorism, crime and other forms of 
armed violence, thus fuelling national and regional instability and threatening the 
security of States.
 Security of ammunition stockpiles can make a major contribution towards 
reducing the risks of diversion of ammunition to illicit markets. 216) Effective 
and efficient security should be considered an essential element of any 
conventional ammunition stockpile management programme as it reduces 
the risk of theft and diversion. 217)
This subsection explains what ammunition storage area security is, what it involves, 
why it is important, as well as what the major components of effective ammunition 
storage area security should include.
What is ammunition storage area security ?
 What is stockpile security ?  
Stockpile security is defined by the IATG as the result of measures taken to 
prevent the theft of explosive ordnance, entry by unauthorized persons into 
explosive storage areas, and acts of malfeasance, such as sabotage. 218)
Effective stockpile management is as much about developing appropriate procedures, 
processes and systems as it is about storage and security infrastructure. Infrastructure 
is expensive, but significant improvements in safety and security can be made at 
minimal cost with system and process improvements. 219) There is a range of activities 
to improve storage area security explained in detail in IATG 09.10 and throughout 
the IATG modules. 
Why is ammunition storage area security important ?
Storage area security protects the national stockpile from diversion of ammunition 
to illicit markets that could threaten the security of a State, impacting its ability to 
meet national and strategic objectives or fuel national and regional instability. 
Stockpile management in accordance with good practices is an important component 
in ensuring that a national authority fulfils its “duty of care” in ensuring that an 
ammunition stockpile is correctly looked after. 220) The systematic control of ammunition 
stockpiles is in keeping with the philosophy of “due care” and States should therefore 
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take a proactive, rather than reactive, stance in ensuring that ammunition is accounted 
for and secured to the highest standards. 221)
What does effective ammunition storage area security look like ?
Effective security of an ammunition area and its ammunition stockpile is “the collective 
result of implemented measures” based on national legislation and regulatory 
requirements, taking into consideration the results of a comprehensive security 
risk assessment that fully considers all potential threats involved and the protection 
which must be afforded. Figure 18 illustrates the primary aims (the outer and inner 
part of the circle) of stockpile security and the main components and considerations 
(inside the circle) associated with a comprehensive physical security system for 
stockpile security. These are all factors that may need to be addressed when 
conducting a stockpile security risk assessment, as further discussed below.
Figure 18 –  Components and aims of effective Ammunition  
Storage Area security
a.
Financial
resourcing b.Security
regulations
d.
Security
plan
e.
Standing
Operating
Procedures
(SOP)
f.
Inventory
and
accounting
systems
g.
Staff
selection
and vetting
h.
Access
control
i.
Physical
security
infrastructure
j.
Physical
security for
perimeter
k.
Diversion/theft
detection
procedures
Quickly detect
any security
breach
Deter and 
reduce incursion 
or theft 
attempts
Quick response
to security
breach
Guard against
external
threats
c.
Security risk
assessment
Guard against
internal threats
Deter theft
and sabotage
Ammunition Storage Area Security SOPs
Broad components and considerations
Legislation, regulatory or statutory
security regulations
04
 —
 I
AT
G
 m
od
ul
es
 s
um
m
ar
y 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
| 100
a. Financial resourcing. Ammunition storage area security and stockpile security 
are expensive ; however, costs are minimal when compared to the overall potential 
value of the ammunition stockpile. These are important functions worth resourcing, 
considering that the purpose of security is to :
• Prevent diversion which can fuel domestic or regional conflicts, or criminal activities ; 
and
• Protect a State’s investment to meet national and strategic objectives.
For these reasons, financial accounting systems should consider the cost of stockpile 
security, which should include infrastructure, depreciation of infrastructure, and 
operating and staff costs over the anticipated life of the ammunition. 222)
b. Security regulations. From an institutional perspective, comprehensive security 
regulations such as legislation, regulatory or statutory instruments, should exist 
as a legal authority on which to structure the security of the national stockpile and 
associated storage and process areas. Requirements should be clear and consistent, 
applicable to the entire stockpile and should be reviewed regularly. 223)
c. Security risk assessment. The importance of stockpile security risk assessment 
as a foundation on which to build security requirements has been mentioned several 
times. Assessment results identify threats that must be guarded against and provide 
the basis as to what security components are necessary to be implemented for 
effective ammunition storage area security.
Using assessment results, the responsible authority will be able to establish 
management priorities to address expected threats in the most cost-effective 
and secure manner, thereby helping to ensure that the residual risk of loss, theft 
or diversion is kept to a minimum. Table 13 provides a general listing of areas that 
should be examined as part of a security risk assessment. 224)
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Table 13 – Stockpile security risk assessment focus areas
• Financial value of facilities and contents within them
• Active hazards to conventional ammunition security and their frequency
• probability of stockpile leakages through espionage, theft or diversion.
• stockpile damage/destruction due to sabotage or other forms of attack.
• Passive hazards and their frequency
• natural catastrophes such as floods, earthquakes, fires, etc.
• Identification of materiel attractive to criminals and terrorist organizations (ACTO). Examples 
of such items include : 225)
• Man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)
• Detonators
• Bulk explosives
• Man-portable anti-tank missiles
• Hand grenades
• Small arms ammunition
The following paragraphs will explain how to deal with security threats and identify 
what role they play as part of comprehensive and effective ammunition storage 
area security.
d. Security plan. The security plan is an essential component of stockpile security 
and should be consistent with security regulations. It should be based on the results 
of a security risk assessment that should be carried out before any security plan 
is drawn up. A security plan should be written for each specific stockpile location 
and adapted, as necessary, for local conditions and requirements that can vary 
between locations. 226) IATG 09.10 provides a security plan format that can be used 
as a model for a State’s own plans. Figure 19 gives an extract from that model and 
shows the type of information that might be included in the security plan.
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Figure 19 – Snapshot of security plan model 227)
Model for a security plan17 (LEVEL 1) 
C.1 Name, location and telephone number of the establishment security officer. 
 
C.2 Scope of the plan. 
 
C.3 Content and value of the stocks. 
 
C.4 The generic security threats. 
 
C.5 Detailed geographic map of the site location and its surroundings. 
 
C.6 Detailed diagrams of the layout of the site, including all its buildings, entry and exit points, 
and of the location of all features such as electricity generators/substations; water and gas 
main points; road and rail tracks; wooded areas; hard and soft-standing areas etc. 
 
C.7 Outline of physical security measures for the site, including but not limited to details of: 
 
a) fences, doors and windows; 
b) lighting; 
c) Intruder Detection System (IDS); 
d) Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS); 
e) automated access control systems; 
f) guards; 
g) guard dogs; 
h) locks and containers; 
i) control of entry and exit of persons; 
j) control of entry and exit of goods and material; 
k) secure rooms; 
l) hardened buildings; and 
m) CCTV. 
C.8 Security responsibilities (including but not limited to the following personnel, as applicable): 
 
a) security officer; 
b) safety officer; 
c) armament officer; 
d) production manager; 
e. Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). Security-related SOPs are implementing 
documents and should be prepared as complementary to security regulations, security 
risk assessment, and security plans. SOPs should lay down clear operational activities, 
requirements and responsibilities for day-to-day and emergency response actions 
to be taken. 228)
Table 14 lists the minimum content that should be included in a SOP.
Table 14 – SOP minimum content 229)
• Scope and terms of references
• Individual in charge
• Generic and known security threats
• Responsible individuals and organizations
• Access control and key control rules and requirements
• Inventory and accounting procedures
• Any detailed security procedures for specific ammunition types and areas
• Actions upon discovery of incursion or diversion (as well as surpluses)
• Actions in response to alarms
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f. Inventory and accounting systems. Important aspects of a security system 
are ammunition accounting and inventory management systems (discussed in 
subsection 4.2). These systems, if effective, can provide timely and reliable detection 
of inadvertent inaccuracy, loss, theft, leakage or diversion. The ability to detect such 
losses is not only a key control measure of effective stockpile management, but 
also of stockpile security, particularly as ineffective stock accounting significantly 
increases the risks of proliferation. 230) Without the ability to detect illicit losses of 
ammunition stocks through an effective and accurate accounting and inventory 
management system, the security of ammunition stockpiles becomes immediately 
ineffective, regardless of how well that security system has been designed.
g. Staff selection and vetting. 231) Physical security and inventory management 
systems become vulnerable if they are compromised through the actions of staff 
members. Organizations should only fill staff positions with individuals without a 
criminal record, criminal connections or tendencies, who are likely to remain loyal, are 
well motivated, and appropriately rewarded. Stockpile management organizations 
should ensure that appropriate procedures are developed and followed for the 
security vetting of staff, prior to employment in ammunition storage areas, and 
that they are security-verified at regular intervals throughout their employment. 
It should also be a condition of their contracts that they shall report any relevant 
changes in personal circumstances to security vetting staff. 232)
h. Access control. Access control is a broad area which involves many security 
components and considerations. Access control relates to personnel and vehicle 
entry into ammunition areas, personnel entry into facilities, as well as key and 
combination lock management and controls. 233)
i. Physical security infrastructure. This component deals with the physical elements 
that are used to control and monitor entry into facilities, such as security requirements 
for doors, gates, windows, locks and padlocks ; intrusion detection systems or alarms, 
associated record keeping, and testing. 234)
Windows should not normally be permitted in explosives buildings. Where this is 
unavoidable they should be as small as possible and (for security) should be non- 
opening. Where opening windows exist, they shall be fitted with approved security 
grilles. 235)
j. Physical security for the perimeter. This component deals with the physical elements 
that are used to delineate the boundary of a protected or restricted area ; it details 
perimeter control, entry/exit points, perimeter intrusion detection systems (PIDS), 
security lighting and closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems. 236)  These are designed 
to resist or discourage external threats that might exist and are the result of a security 
risk assessment. Fencing is the most obvious first step that can be taken with regards 
to perimeter protection ; Table 15 provides information about the four types of fencing 
available and the threats they deter. Physical security for temporary sites is harder 
to achieve due mainly to the large ground area that they cover. Perimeter security 
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of temporary sites should be the highest priority, and this may be achieved by using 
a combination of armed guards, patrols, guard dogs and temporary fencing. 237)
Table 15 – Types of perimeter fence  238)
Class 1 • Minimum 1.5 m high
• Primarily to delineate a boundary
• No particular security requirements/
provides no deterrence 
Class 2 • Anti-intruder fence that offers some 
resistance
• Should be supported by other 
perimeter security systems 
Class 3 • Intermediate security barrier
• Designed to deter or delay
• Offers resistance to attempts at 
climbing and breaching
• Should be supported by other 
perimeter security systems
• Welded mesh resists climbing and 
cutting
• Offers a good balance between 
resistance versus cost
Class 4 • High security barrier designed for 
maximum deterrence
• High degree of resistance to climbing 
or breaching
• Must be supported by other perimeter 
security systems
• Should always be used in conjunction 
with CCTV and an intruder detection 
system
• Expensive to construct
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Other aspects of perimeter security that should be considered include :
• Clear zones free of vegetation both within (4 m) and outside (10 m) of the security 
fence to provide good visibility of the fence line by security staff and perimeter 
security systems (if used). 239)
• Penetration of land under fences for drainage, etc. should also be addressed for 
security reasons. Drainage openings or passages should have bars and grilles 
preventing access at each end. 240)
• Perimeter lighting both inside the perimeter fence and outside the fence should 
provide sufficient light to allow detection of unauthorized activity. Access points to 
the storage area should have direct illumination above the entry points, Lighting 
should be installed in accordance with the requirements of IATG 05.40.
• A perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS) is a generic term which covers a 
wide range of technologies designed to provide advance warning of an intruder 
gaining access to a secure area.
• Visual surveillance systems can be used to increase the effective range and area 
of ground covered by individual members of the security staff, thereby minimizing 
staff requirements. Technology is available that can provide day, low-light, and night 
coverage.
• Roving patrols and trained working dogs can be used to complement an existing 
guard and response force, by conducting security and building checks during 
non-duty hours. 241)
k. Diversion/theft detection procedures. Any diversion should be immediately 
and expediently investigated to determine the nature of the diversion, identify any 
deficiencies in the security system, and enable corrective action. The goal of this 
investigation (different from a criminal investigation to determine culpability) is to 
assess the security system, identify and close gaps in the security system and to 
prevent a similar event from occurring. Depending on the results of the investigation 
and the scale of the loss, counter-diversion activities may need to be carried out. 
Principles of counter-diversion are detailed in table 2 of IATG 09.10 and these 
principles should be used as a guide for policymakers, law enforcement, customs, 
arms export, transportation and traffic control agencies to counter diversion of 
ammunition and explosives once their loss from the stockpile has been detected.
4.9  AMMUNITION DEMILITARIZATION AND DESTRUCTION
Disposal of ammunition refers to the removal of ammunition and explosives from 
a stockpile by utilizing a variety of methods (that may not necessarily involve de-
struction). Demilitarization and destruction of ammunition are covered in IATG 10.10. 
Disposal of ammunition using these methods is an important subject, as the excess 
accumulation of ammunition in conventional ammunition state stockpiles has long 
been identified as a problem and the implementation of effective measures to 
address unserviceable and shelf-life expired munitions is an essential precursor to 
04
 —
 I
AT
G
 m
od
ul
es
 s
um
m
ar
y 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
| 106
reducing the probability and consequences of unplanned explosions at munitions 
sites. 242) This section provides an overview of demilitarization and destruction 
processes and activities as described in the IATG.
 What is disposal ?  
The IATG define disposal as the removal of ammunition and explosives 
from a stockpile by utilizing a variety of methods, (that may not necessarily 
involve destruction). Logistical disposal may or may not require the use of 
render safe procedures. 
There are six traditional methods of disposal used by armed forces around 
the world : sale ; gift/donation ; use for training ; deep sea dumping ; landfill ; 
and destruction or demilitarization. 243) Of these, destruction and 
demilitarization are the preferred modes of disposal. 244)
What is the ammunition demilitarization and destruction cycle ?
IATG 10.10 provides an overview of the various disposal options. 245) However, the 
module stresses that the most acceptable and practical methods of disposal are 
destruction or demilitarization. 246) Demilitarization of ammunition tends to suggest 
the industrial processing of ammunition and it implies the use of complex machinery 
to break down and gain access to explosive components. An essential ingredient 
of all ammunition demilitarization activities is the ability to carry out the processing 
of ammunition, discussed in section 4.6. Figure 20 provides an overview of the 
ammunition demilitarization and destruction cycle as described by the IATG. 247)
 What is demilitarization ?  
According to the IATG, demilitarization refers to the complete range of 
processes that render weapons, ammunition and explosives unfit for their 
originally intended purpose. Demilitarization not only involves the final 
destruction process, but also includes all other transport, storage, 
accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally critical to 
achieving the final result. 248)
What is destruction ?  
The IATG define destruction as the process of final conversion of weapons, 
ammunition and explosives into an inert state so that the item can no longer 
function as designed. 249)
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Figure 20 – Ammunition demilitarization and destruction cycle
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It is essential that ammunition disposal is not considered as a stand-alone activity and 
is instead viewed as a fundamental part of the effective through life management of 
ammunition. Even in well-resourced States, ammunition demilitarization and disposal 
are sometimes seen as an unwanted expense and prioritized accordingly. If not 
afforded a sufficiently high priority, unserviceable ammunition stocks awaiting 
disposal can fill up available ammunition storage space and prevent the effective 
storage and management of operational ammunition. Ammunition which has passed 
its shelf life may also degrade to the extent that the energetic contents pose a 
severe spontaneous fire and explosion risk.
What are the principal demilitarization and destruction techniques ?
Various technologies and techniques are available for demilitarizing and destroying 
ammunition. 250)  The IATG suggest that open burning (OB) and open detonation (OD) 
are the easiest ways for States with limited capabilities to undertake the disposal of 
ammunition, and both techniques are particularly appropriate for the destruction of 
non-complex weapons in relatively small quantities. While OB and OD are relatively 
simple processes and are easy to implement, some complex weapons require a 
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degree of pre-processing, often to separate propulsive components, such as booster 
and second stage rocket motors from high explosive warheads. For this reason, 
OB and OD may still be applicable as part of a broader approach to ammunition 
destruction featuring demilitarization. 251)
 Open burning (OB) : A technique often used for the disposal of military 
propellants and pyrotechnical compositions. The disposal of the latter, in 
particular, has potential environmental implications due to the presence of 
heavy metals in some pyrotechnical compositions and the release of 
volatile and semi-volatile toxic substances during the low-temperature 
burning process. In selecting a suitable site for burning, great care must be 
taken to prevent accidental fires from spreading, particularly in hot climates. 
Open burning is particularly effective for the disposal of bulk propellant 
charges associated with artillery and tank ammunition. 
Open detonation (OD) : A technique where a small quantity of serviceable 
explosive (the donor charge) is used to initiate the explosive filling in the 
ammunition being disposed of. While OD is an effective technique to be 
conducted safely, it requires suitably qualified and experienced personnel 
to plan, supervise and conduct OD operations. 
NOTE ; only suitably qualified and experienced personnel should conduct 
demilitarization and destruction techniques.
 Although not described by the IATG in detail, explosive harvesting systems 
are a useful mode of demilitarization and destruction. Explosive harvesting 
systems are described in generic terms in IATG 10.10, para. 9.2.4 and para. 
9.2.7. It is considered a RRPL 3 activity. 
Explosive harvesting is a technique used in some parts of the world to 
repurpose the high explosive found in military munitions, for example, for 
use as quarrying charges. A number of commercial explosive harvesting 
systems have been implemented.
Technical considerations for ammunition demilitarization and disposal
In order to determine the most suitable method of ammunition disposal, States 
should consider the following factors : 252)
• Safety. Safety is paramount when considering a method of ammunition disposal. 
If the ammunition has deteriorated to such a condition where it is unsafe to 
move and process then local disposal by open burning (OB) or open detonation 
(OD) may be the only feasible solution.
• Feasibility. The quantity of ammunition to be disposed of is an important factor 
in determining the most economic method of disposal. If many thousands of 
identical items are to be processed and the process may yield recoverable 
materials such as metals, then there may be a sound economic case for initiating 
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a disposal programme based on demilitarization. If the quantity of ammunition 
to be disposed of is relatively small or is made up of a diverse range of items, 
then OB/OD will probably be a more economically feasible solution.
• National legislation. National legislation, particularly environmental legislation 
and regulations, may dictate the most appropriate method of disposal. Generally, 
open detonation of large quantities of ammunition is not usually viable in areas 
of high population density. Some States and international organizations will only 
support large-scale ammunition disposal projects based on demilitarization, with 
appropriate reuse of recovered materials.
• Technical capabilities of the conducting State. OB/OD generally requires a 
lower level of technical capability than industrial demilitarization. In austere 
environments, consideration should also be given to the level of local equipment 
and logistical support capabilities which are present.
• Complexity of the ammunition type. The complexity of the ammunition type is 
critical in determining the most appropriate technical means of disposal. Complex 
weapons, such as liquid-fuelled missiles and other large guided weapons for air 
and maritime platforms, invariably require complex processing prior to disposal. 
OB/OD of the complete item shall only be carried out when all other options 
have been investigated and eliminated.
• Availability of technology and supporting infrastructure. The availability of 
infrastructure to permit the safe processing of ammunition will determine the 
extent to which industrial demilitarization techniques may be employed. Temporary 
or mobile ammunition inspection or processing facilities are particularly useful 
if fixed ammunition process buildings are not available.
• Security. Security and the risk of stock diversion is an important factor in deter-
mining how quickly ammunition should be disposed of. For bulk explosives and 
detonators, of which both are highly desirable to terrorist groups, OB/OD may be 
the fastest and most appropriate means by which these simple IED precursors 
may be rendered unusable.
Non-technical considerations
The IATG strongly recommend that only environmentally-sound methods of 
demilitarization and destruction be adopted. Two methods of disposal previously 
used - disposal by landfill (burial) and deep-sea dumping - are now strongly dis-
couraged. Disposal by landfill was commonly used in the early 20th century for the 
disposal of chemical-filled munitions and resulted in long-term pollution of ground 
water. Deep-sea dumping was widely used up to the late 20th century and is now 
prohibited by treaty. Disposal by landfill or deep-sea dumping will not be supported 
by UN programmes. 253)
Treaty obligations such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions may affect ammunition disposal options.
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Ammunition control and stockpile management during demilitarization and 
disposal operations
An effective strategy covering disposal, destruction and demilitarization is a fundamental 
element of good life-cycle management of ammunition. Ammunition managers and 
logistics staff must consider the complete through life management of ammunition 
and not just focus on the acquisition and in-service phases. An effective ammunition 
disposal strategy helps ensure that ammunition is disposed of promptly and that 
scarce licenced storage space in ammunition storage areas is not “wasted” through 
the requirement to store unserviceable or surplus ammunition stock for long periods 
while it awaits disposal.
The IATG suggest that ammunition is destroyed in accordance with the following 
priorities :  254)
• Priority 1. 
• Ammunition that poses the greatest risks to the civilian community in terms 
of explosive safety ;
• Ammunition that is Attractive to Criminal and Terrorist Organisations (ACTO).
• Priority 2. 
• Ammunition that must be destroyed in order to meet treaty obligations ;
• Small Arms Ammunition.
• Priority 3. 
• Ammunition that needs to be destroyed to release storage space ;
• Remaining ammunition types.
It is the decision of each State to assess its disposal and destruction priorities taking 
into account security, safety and financial considerations as well as the capability 
of conducting the demilitarization process.
4.10  AMMUNITION ACCIDENTS, REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION
The reporting and investigation of accidents involving ammunition is a fundamental 
element of an effective ammunition safety management system. Ammunition acci-
dents may indicate areas which need to be addressed in training, particularly when 
the ammunition accident is determined to be caused by an error in the weapons 
system drill, or by poor or unsafe weapons system handling.
More importantly, the investigation of ammunition accidents may indicate a signif-
icant problem with a particular manufactured batch of ammunition. It may also 
demonstrate that ammunition is deteriorating while in storage and the operational 
effectiveness of the munitions in the stockpile can no longer be relied upon or that 
the ammunition item may no longer be safe for use. Recommended procedures for 
ammunition accident reporting and investigation  255) and a suggested investigation 
methodology  256) are described in the IATG. This section provides an overview of 
these aspects by drawing on material from IATG 11.10 and IATG 11.20.
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What are ammunition accidents and why should they be investigated ?
 What are ammunition accidents ?  
The IATG define ammunition accidents as any incident involving 
ammunition or explosives that results in, or has potential to result in, death 
or injury to a person(s) and/or damage to equipment and/or property 
whether military or civilian. 257)
What is an incident ?  
According to the IATG, the term incident refers generically to all accidents, 
performance failures and faults involving ammunition or where 
ammunition is present. 258)
The principal reasons why ammunition accidents should be investigated are to :  259)
• Improve safety and to prevent a reoccurrence of the accident ;
• Identify faults in the manufacture of particular batches of ammunition ;
• Identify underlying faults in the design of ammunition. This is particularly relevant 
for types of ammunition which are only used occasionally during training ;
• Identify ammunition that is deteriorating in an unsafe mode during storage ;
• Identify common errors in the weapons system drill and issues that need to be 
addressed in training ;
• Provide information to support legal or other judicial proceedings ;
• Conform with national legislation on health and safety ;
• Provide information to improve future weapon and ammunition design.
The national authority should specify how ammunition accidents are to be reported 
and how the follow-up investigation should be conducted.
The following actions should be taken by the Unit and personnel using the ammunition 
in the event of an accident :  260)
• Cease firing ;
• Immediate medical support and casualty evacuation to injured parties ;
• Secure the scene ;
• Report the accident to the investigating authority ;
• Ensure witness details are recorded and that witnesses are made available for 
the subsequent accident investigation ;
• Ensure that any related weapons system is made safe and secure and is not 
operated.
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The investigating authority is the entity nominated by the national authority with 
responsibility to conduct ammunition accident investigations.  261)  The investigating 
authority should :
• Maintain a team of competent accident investigators ;
• Assign one or more accident investigators to each ammunition accident ;
• Examine the technical reports submitted by ammunition accident investigators 
on each accident ;
• Direct further testing and investigation of the munitions stockpile, if required ;
• Consult with other entities involved in the Life-Cycle Management of Ammunition 
such as the ammunition procurement organization, the manufacturer and the 
military organization responsible for training on the related weapons system ;
• Make a technical judgment on the cause of the accident and inform all interested 
parties ;
• Provide support to judicial and legal proceedings as determined by national 
regulations and legislation ;
• Initiate remedial action in order to prevent a reoccurrence of the incident.
The ammunition accident investigator is the person assigned by the investigating 
authority to conduct the accident investigation. The ammunition accident investigator 
should :  262)
• Examine the scene of the accident ;
• Ensure that the scene is safe ;
• Examine any ammunition or weapons system involved in the accident ;
• Identify the type and lot of ammunition involved and advise the investigating 
authority to initiate a ban or constraint on the ammunition involved ;  263)
• Conduct an ammunition accident investigation ;
• Make an initial assessment as to the likely cause of the accident ;
• Submit an ammunition accident investigation report to the investigating authority.
What is ammunition accident investigation methodology ?
 The first priority of the accident investigator is to ensure that the scene is 
safe and that any explosive or non-explosive hazards are addressed before 
the accident investigation commences. At the scene of explosion or 
ammunition accident involving combat vehicles, where multiple items of 
ammunition may have been involved, the investigator should be aware of 
the particular hazards posed by ammunition items which have been subject 
to fire or explosion and have not functioned. Where necessary, these items 
should be recorded and photographed in situ before they are dealt with 
using explosive ordnance procedures.
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It is essential that the scene of the accident is undisturbed in order for evidence to 
be collected, and the true cause of the accident determined. 264) As a rule, only those 
actions required to preserve life should be taken at the scene and the remains of 
those certified dead by a doctor should stay in place until the initial phase of the 
accident investigation has been concluded. To preserve the integrity of the scene 
and material collected, the following factors should be considered :
• Forensic gloves, boots and suits should be worn, if appropriate ;
• If possible, the investigator should establish a common approach path to the 
scene of the accident, to minimize the disruption of small items of evidence ;
• Collection of evidence should involve a minimum number of personnel. If the 
civil or military police are involved in the accident investigation then it may be 
appropriate for a crime scene investigator to log, collect and present any items 
of evidence which are recovered ;
• Evidence, once collected and packaged, should not be left unattended or 
unsecured.
 Ammunition investigators should adhere to the following guidelines when 
dealing with human remains :
•  The bodies of any victims must always be treated with respect ;
•  The investigator should be aware of the hazard posed by contact with 
contaminated body fluids. Gloves and other protective clothing should be 
worn to reduce this hazard ;
•  If it is possible that victims’ bodies may contain fragments of ammunition 
items, this should be indicated to the forensic collection agencies and 
steps taken later to recover evidence during post mortem examination.
There are several types of evidence which may be collected at an accident scene :  265)
• Witness evidence. Witness evidence is extremely important in determining the 
sequence of events in the run up to the accident taking place. Witnesses should 
be questioned separately, and all evidence obtained should be presented in a 
signed witness statement. Accident investigators should be aware that witnesses 
may present false testimony in order to cover up their perceived culpability in 
an accident.
• Physical (or forensic) evidence. Physical evidence includes all evidence recovered 
at the scene which may later assist in determining the actual cause of the accident.
• Photographic evidence. Photography is an invaluable aid to documenting an 
ammunition accident and maximum use should be made of high-resolution 
digital imagery.
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It is important that the accident investigator considers all available evidence. The IATG 
provide comprehensive guidance to accident investigators in determining the actual 
cause of an accident. 266) The accident investigator should submit a comprehensive 
report and all of the collected evidence to the investigating authority on completion 
of the investigation. 267)
Box 6 – An example of an ammunition accident and investigation
On 9 March 1997, a 155 mm artillery projectile exploded prematurely in the barrel of an 
FH2000 howitzer during a live firing exercise conducted by the Singapore Armed Forces 
(SAF) in New Zealand. 268) The accident resulted in the deaths of two SAF servicemen and 
injuries to a further twelve. The post-incident investigation and committee of enquiry 
concluded that the incident was probably caused by a defective fuze fitted to the artillery 
projectile. Figure 22 shows a photograph of the howitzer taken during the course of the 
ammunition accident investigation.
The Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) convened a committee of inquiry and 
released a report on 28 June 1997. 269) The committee found after the incident that 1.3% 
of the fuzes from the same lot which was involved in the accident were defective. 
This defective lot of fuzes was supplied by Chartered Ammunition Industries (CAI) to 
MINDEF under an agreement in 1992. CAI was to supply fuzes manufactured according 
to internationally accepted military specifications. These military specifications 
require thorough inspections and other quality control measures during and after the 
manufacturing process to eliminate all defects in the fuzes. CAI, in turn, had contracted 
a US company, Island Ordnance Systems (IOS), for the supply of these fuzes.
Without the knowledge of CAI, IOS obtained the fuzes from Xian Dong Fang Machinery 
Factory in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In October 1994, CAI discovered that the 
fuzes had been manufactured at a factory in the PRC rather than in the USA. However, 
CAI did not notify MINDEF of this fact. MINDEF only became aware that these fuzes 
had been manufactured in the PRC during the committee of inquiry proceedings. 
Furthermore, the committee found that no breach of SAF training safety regulations 
was applicable in this incident. 270)
04
 —
 I
AT
G
 m
od
ul
es
 s
um
m
ar
y 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
115 |
Figure 21 –  Effects of a premature bore explosion on a Singapore Armed Forces  
155 mm howitzer 271)
4.11  AMMUNITION OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
National operations associated with deployment or small tactical units will likely 
require the use and storage of ammunition. However, due to distance or an isolated 
location, national support for such operations may be substantially less, compared 
to that provided at a base or logistics level. 272) Compounding the issue is that such 
operations could be faced with a need to store unique, non-stockpile type ammunition 
or explosives, such as captured enemy ammunition, seized contraband, or criminal 
evidence. Despite these limitations and challenges, safe and secure management 
practices are still vitally necessary to protect the mission ; national or multi-national 
(where supporting a multi-national operation) personnel and assets ; the public ; 
and possibly other important assets, such as criminal evidence, from the risks 
associated with an unplanned explosion event or diversion.
 National operations associated with deployment may include,  
1) those mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC),  
2) those undertaken by regional organizations (e.g. African Union), or  
3) those undertaken by coalitions. 273)
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 What is a small unit ?  
A small unit is defined as any government organization, at the tactical level, 
where individuals are involved in the storage, handling and use of 
ammunition and explosives but are not directly managed by ammunition 
qualified personnel. Examples include police stations, isolated small 
military units and border guard posts. 274)
Prior to the start of operations, it is important for a State to perform proper planning 
to address expected challenges and consider operational support needs. Important 
stockpile management tasks should be identified, prioritized and resourced, and 
proper guidance should be provided as well for accomplishing required tasks. These 
activities should be accomplished from the perspective of maintaining effective risk 
management, towards keeping risk at an acceptable level. Operational support needs 
can change over time as a function of the phase of the operation, so the review and 
assessment of operations is a continuous process. This subsection outlines what 
operational support consists of, why it is important, what guidance is available, and 
what the basic components of an effective operational support system should look like.
What is operational support ?
Both deployed forces and small units operate in unique environments where there 
might be difficulty in obtaining ammunition-qualified personnel, the necessary 
supporting infrastructure, andthe ability to implement and use typical national 
processes and systems. On this basis, operational support is the fulfilment of State 
actions necessary to give operational units the minimum capabilities and resources 
needed for proper and effective management of ammunition and explosives under 
their control, in order to mitigate risk from an unplanned explosion event or diversion, 
and ensure the functionality of stockpile ammunition.
Why is operational support important ?
The principles and procedures for the safe, effective and efficient storage, handling, 
transport and use of ammunition and explosives are the same whether these materials 
are in an explosive storage area, a temporary or field storage location, or within a small 
unit. 275) However, the potential risk and probability of an unplanned explosion event 
or diversion can differ significantly for each of these based on availability of qualified 
personnel, available resources, and the care, maintenance, and management of 
the ammunition and explosives being stored. The fact remains that regardless of 
any difficulties and challenges associated with deployment and small unit isolation, 
the responsibility to protect the health and safety of unit, national and multi-national 
members, the general public and the natural environment remains with the State, 
via the force commander. 276)   To help ensure that protection, a State should provide 
operational support, guidance and resources to help meet minimum national safety 
and security requirements. 
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What does effective operational support look like ?
For the reasons previously discussed, a State should treat ammunition and explosives 
under its care in the same manner, regardless of where it is located or the conditions 
under which it is stored. It can also be argued that deployed ammunition and 
unique ammunition and explosives should receive additional attention due to the 
environment and conditions they may operate in and because these areas can 
influence safety, functionality and shelf life.
To help States address operational risks associated with ammunition and explosives, 
IATG 12.10 was developed to assist deployed forces, and IATG 12.20 was developed 
to assist small units. These two modules are intended to help ensure that storage 
practices can meet the minimum requirements relating to RRPL 1, which will often 
reduce risk significantly. Ongoing and gradual improvements can then be made 
to the stockpile management infrastructure and processes as staff development 
improves and further resources become available. 277)
Operational planning. Effective operational support begins with comprehensive 
operational planning (at national and multi-national levels, as appropriate) conducted 
prior to a mission or an operation commencing. Annex C of IATG 12.10 provides a 
checklist of important considerations pertaining to operational planning. The content 
of Table 16 is an extract from this Annex and gives an indication of the type of 
operational support information that should be collected.
Table 16 – Planning considerations for the operational force commander  278)
SER ITEM
1 What are the threats to the mission ?
2 Is there an up-to-date reconnaissance report for ammuniton storage areas 
avaiable ?
3 Is there sufficient ammunition technical knowledge available in the 
reconnaissance party concerning ammuniton safety and ammuniton risk 
management (storage, handling & maintenance) ?
4 Is there an appropriately qualified officer responsible for ammuniton safety and 
risk management during this operation (E.g. ATO) ?
5 Are there enough qualified soldiers for the safe handling of ammuniton ?
6 Is there enough mechanical handling equipment for the
different types of ammuniton ?
7 Is there enough space for the safe storage, handling and maintanance of the 
ammunition in accordance with the recommandations of IATG 04.10 ?  
If not what are the effects and the risks for own troops ans material ?
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As part of operational planning, other important aspects related to storage and explosives 
safety matters may need to be considered and addressed, such as the chain of 
command and roles and responsibilities 279) for participating States, the mission 
commander, force commander/base commander, Force Explosives Safety Officer 
(FESO), commander of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) and base commander 
support elements. Other aspects include the development of agreements, approval 
of authorities for deviations from explosives safety requirements, licensing of 
explosives locations, real-estate and construction management, etc.
On an operational base there may, by necessity, be more reliance on risk management 
and the carrying out of explosion consequence analyses. The force commander is 
responsible for striking a balance between safety and operational requirements and 
therefore should : 280)
• Be informed when minimum standards cannot be met ; and
• Understand the possible consequences of any reduction in safety criteria.
Consequently, risk parameters (such as what is an acceptable risk) and approval 
levels should be well defined in national and mission documents.
Operational support. Effective operational support should be accomplished through 
national train-as-you-fight courses, procedures and exercises, meaning that operational 
aspects are based on established and implemented national processes and proce-
dures that would also apply to deployments and small units. This approach provides 
for a consistent national basis for risk management. Operational environments will 
always present challenges, but these can often be overcome with proper training, 
planning, support, and adequate resources. Methods and techniques that can help 
offset such challenges include :
• Having a national explosives safety standard and procedures for stockpile 
management and safety ; the availability of basic and clear procedures for the 
conduct of ammunition and explosives safety-related processes. The IATG can 
be used to support national efforts to develop such documents ;
• Availability of call-back support capabilities for deployed or small unit personnel ;
• National command oversight, as well as periodic technical assistance visits from 
national experts (such as surveillance, disposal, inspections, etc.) ;
• Awareness of techniques and methodologies available to help reduce the risk 
and consequences of any explosion incident and for preventing diversion ;
• Appropriate training and high reliance on risk management methodologies and 
decision making, and acceptance of residual risk at the appropriate authority 
level, whenever minimum recommendations cannot be met ;
• For deployment operations : managing the specific activities and operations listed 
in Table 17, which summarizes minimum recommendations (given in IATG 12.10) 
for the safety and security management of ammunition-related storage and 
transport.
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Table 17 – Ammunition storage on operations – IATG requirements 281)
Requirement Summary IATG Reference
Accounting • Accounting systems 
• Stack tally cards
• Stocktaking and audits
03.10 14.2
14.5
14.6
Ammunition 
accidents
• Actions by user unit
• Reporting format
11.10 8
Annex C
Classification of 
ammunition and 
explosives
• Ammunition and explosives are 
classified in accordance with the UN 
Globally Harmonized System
01.50 6.1
6.2
Controlled articles 
and contraband
• The prohibition of contraband within 
temporary or field storage
06.10 5.3
Documentation 
and records
(held in magazine)
• Explosives Limit Licence
• Humidity record
• PES log book
• Temperature record
02.30
06.70
06.70
06.70
7
Annex D
Annex C
Annex D
Explosives licence • Required to ensure that safe levels of 
storage are authorized and maintained
02.30 7
Faults and 
performance 
failures during use
• System for the reporting of ammunition 
faults and performance failures when 
used for training or on operations
01.60 7
8
Annex C
Fire safety • Fire alarm systems
• Fire practices
• Fire signs and symbols
• Immediate firefighting appliances
• Unit immediate actions
• Supplementary
02.50
04.10
7
8.2
10.2
10.3
11.1
11
Mixing rules • Ensuring that ammunition of conflicting 
Compatibility Groups are not stored 
together
04.10 8.1
Quantity and 
separation 
distances
• These should be developed by qualified 
ammunition personnel and will be 
clearly stated on the Explosives Limit 
Licence
04.10 6.0
8.4
8.5
Transport of 
ammunition
• In accordance with UN Model 
Regulations
08.10 All
Warning signs • In accordance with the UN Globally 
Harmonized System
01.50 6.1
6.1.1
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• For small unit operations - managing operations listed in Table 18, which summarizes 
minimum recommendations (given in IATG 12.20) for the safety and security 
management of ammunition-related storage and transport.
Table 18 – Small unit ammunition storage – IATG requirements 282)
Requirement Summary IATG Reference
Accounting  Accounting systems 
 Stack tally cards
 Stocktaking and audits
03.10 14.2
14.5
14.6
Ammunition 
accidents
Actions by user unit
Reporting format
11.10 8
Annex C
Bans and 
constraints
To ensure that ammunition that is either 
banned or constrained for use is identified 
and segregated
01.70 6
7
Classification of 
ammunition and 
explosives
Ammunition and explosives are classified 
in accordance with the UN Globally 
Harmonized System
01.50 6.1
6.2
Controlled articles 
and contraband
The prohibition of contraband within small 
magazines 
06.10 5.3
Documentation 
and records
(held in magazine)
Explosives Limit Licence
Humidity record
PES log book
Temperature record
02.30
06.70
06.70
06.70
7
Annex D
Annex C
Annex D
Explosives licence Required to ensure that safe levels of 
storage are authorized and maintained
02.30 7
Faults and 
performance 
failures during use
System for the reporting of ammunition 
faults and performance failures when used 
for training or on operations
01.60 7
8
Annex C
Fire safety Fire alarm systems
Fire practices
Fire signs and symbols
Immediate firefighting appliances
Immediate actions of unit
02.50 7
8.2
10.2
10.3
11.1
Inspections 
(external)
To ensure that unit ammunition stores are 
appropriately inspected on a regular basis
06.70 5.2
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Requirement Summary IATG Reference
Inspections 
(internal)
To ensure that unit ammunition stores are 
appropriately inspected on a regular basis
06.70 5.1
Log books 
(magazine)
Log books for Potential Exposion Sites 
(PES) should be kept and maintained
06.70 5.1.1
Mixing rules To ensure that ammunition of conflicting 
Compatibility Groups are not stored 
together
01.50 7.1
Quantity and 
separation 
distances
These should be developed by qualified 
ammunition personnel and will be clearly 
stated on the Explosives Limit Licence
02.20 Not for 
unit use
Risk analysis and 
acceptance 283)
Should resources not be available to 
achieve the requirements of this IATG, 
then the residual risk SHALL be formally 
accepted at the appropriate level. This 
should normally not be below ministerial 
level
02.10 11
Security of 
magazines
Access control
Physical security infrastructure
09.10 8.5
8.6
Transport of 
ammunition
In accordance with UN Model Regulations 08.10 All
Warning signs In accordance with the UN Globally 
Harmonized System
01.50 6.1
6.1.1
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